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A DYNAMIC THEORY OF JUDICIAL ROLE 
DAVID LANDAU* 
Abstract: Recent scholarship has focused heavily on the activism of courts in the 
fragile democracies of the “Global South.” Courts in countries like India, Co-
lombia, and South Africa have issued landmark decisions in difficult political en-
vironments, in the process raising unanswered questions about the appropriate 
conception of judicial role in these climates. Much of the judicial and academic 
effort in these contexts is self-consciously oriented towards using courts to carry 
out basic improvements in the quality of political systems seen as badly deficient. 
In other words, the core task is to improve the quality of the democratic system 
over time. These kinds of democracy-improving theories obviously bear a re-
semblance to “political process” theories in United States constitutional law, but 
generally differ in terms of the sweeping degree to which democracy is viewed as 
dysfunctional. This Article critically examines the democracy-improving model 
of judicial review. It argues that such a theory faces several important challenges: 
more work must be done to assess the plausibility and effectiveness of judicial 
action to improve democracy, as well as the ability of the theory to distinguish 
between proper and improper uses of judicial power. At the same time, it sheds 
new light on important problems in the field of comparative constitutional law 
and suggests a useful empirical agenda: rather than asking whether courts actual-
ly are overstepping their bounds by taking on legislative tasks, scholars can ask 
about the effects of different strategies of judicial activism on the evolution of 
different kinds of dysfunctional political institutions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent scholarship has focused on the role of constitutional courts in new 
or threatened democracies.1 This literature has pointed out that these courts are 
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 1 For examples of the recent literature on democratic transitions and judicial role, see Samuel 
Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO. L.J. 961, 964 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts] (studying the role of constitutional courts in protecting demo-
cratic orders); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2007) [here-
inafter Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies] (arguing that the fragility of some democratic orders justi-
fies measures like the banning of certain parties in order to preserve the democratic order); David 
Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 200–11 (2013) (considering the 
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often faced with particular challenges that are different from the ones found in 
more mature democracies. Courts may act in “fragile democracies” that are at 
risk of sliding back into authoritarianism. They often act in the midst of poor-
ly-functioning political systems, and they generally face the challenge of en-
forcing rights—like socioeconomic rights—that are costly to enforce. At the 
same time, any assumption that courts acting in poorly-functioning political 
environments are always weak courts has been definitively proven false. 
Courts in places like India, Colombia, and South Africa have shown a surpris-
ing level of activism and independence. 
This work problematizes the relationship between judicial review and 
democracy in different kinds of political contexts. Most clearly, it suggests the 
following question: what is the relevance of standard constitutional theory, 
which was developed largely in the United States, to contexts where democrat-
ic regimes are particularly vulnerable to overthrow or where democratic insti-
tutions are poorly-functioning? 
Standard democratic theory, as developed in the United States and Eu-
rope, rests on premises that—by their own terms—do not apply in many newer 
democracies. For example, Jeremy Waldron’s case for judicial deference rests 
on an assumption of well-functioning political institutions,2 and Mark Tush-
net’s case for popular constitutionalism assumes a robust constitutional cul-
ture.3 A series of dysfunctions in new democracies—vulnerability to authori-
tarian erosion, defects in party systems and legislative institutions, and an ab-
sence of constitutional culture—render these assumptions inapplicable. The 
key question then becomes: if standard political theory is inapplicable, what is 
the proper conception of judicial role? New scholarship argues that there is a 
distinctive “constitutionalism of the Global South,” but to date this literature 
has focused more on a set of problems or topics faced by developing regimes, 
such as socioeconomic rights or access to justice, rather than on a unifying 
conception of the judicial role.4 
This Article aims to fill that gap. Descriptively, it shows that judicial role 
and constitutional design in new democracies often work off of the premise 
                                                                                                                           
problem of constitutional changes that work a significant erosion to the “democratic order,” as well as 
responses to the problem); Ozan Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 409, 409 (2014) 
(arguing that the use of temporary rather than permanent constitutions can help to resolve various 
problems associated with democratic transitions). 
 2 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1362 
(2006) (making explicit an assumption of a legislature in “reasonably good working order”). 
 3 See Mark Tushnet, The Relation Between Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial 
Review, 14 GERMAN L.J. 2249, 2255–56 (2013). 
 4 See, e.g., Daniel Bonilla Maldonado, Introduction: Towards a Constitutionalism of the Global 
South, in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: THE ACTIVIST TRIBUNALS OF INDIA, SOUTH 
AFRICA, AND COLOMBIA 1 (Daniel Bonilla Maldonado ed., 2013) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM 
OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH] (introducing a comparative study of three topics: socioeconomic rights, cul-
tural diversity, and access to justice). 
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that democratic institutions should be distrusted, and not just to protect insular 
minorities but also to carry out majoritarian will. Judges and constitutional 
drafters in these countries are notably unconcerned with the classic counter-
majoritarian difficulty or the dilemma of courts imposing on democratic space 
and taking on legislative roles. This is because they are focused on a different 
problem: how to make democratic institutions work better. Courts and other 
non-democratic institutions often see their role within such a regime as dynam-
ic in nature: they aim to improve the performance of political institutions 
through time. 
I bring together evidence chiefly from three widely studied countries—
Colombia, India, and South Africa—to show how courts have developed tools 
to protect democracies from erosion from within, to ameliorate defects in dif-
ferent kinds of party systems, and to build up civil society and constitutional 
cultures. A range of practices in newer democracies can best be understood 
through a dynamic rather than a traditional conception of judicial role. For ex-
ample, courts in newer democracies routinely strike down constitutional 
amendments as being substantively unconstitutional because they view those 
amendments as a threat to democracy. From a standard theoretical perspective, 
striking down constitutional amendments is a much more difficult act to justify 
than ordinary judicial review. As commentators have often noted, declaring a 
constitutional amendment unconstitutional poses a kind of ultimate counter-
majoritarian difficulty, because there is no real way for democratic actors to 
override the decision to strike down the constitutional amendment.5 But the 
doctrine of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment becomes easier to 
understand with a dynamic theory, either as a way to defend against democrat-
ic erosion or as a way to send a loud signal about the importance of core con-
stitutional values. 
Normatively, this article proceeds more cautiously, but suggests that a dy-
namic theory of judicial role is both defensible and useful in guiding scholars 
towards a fruitful set of questions. It sheds new light on some of the most ac-
tive and difficult debates in the field of comparative constitutional law. Take, 
for example, the debate on socioeconomic rights enforcement between schol-
ars, like Tushnet and Cass Sunstein, favoring “weaker” and more dialogical 
methods of enforcement and those scholars instead favoring more aggressive 
or “harder” approaches like structural injunctions.6 The main question analysts 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See, e.g., Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1763, 1799 (2004) (noting that the doctrine raises perhaps the “most extreme” form of the counter-
majoritarian difficulty). 
 6 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 221–38 (2001) 
(considering social and economic rights cases in the South African context as using “weak-form” 
judicial action); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL 
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have asked is how to square effective judicial review of socioeconomic 
rights—which puts courts in the awkward position of having to prioritize and 
manage resource allocation—with due deference to democratic institutions. A 
dynamic perspective suggests a somewhat distinct agenda that transcends the 
“strong-form”/“weak-form” typology: courts and scholars should focus on fig-
uring out which kinds of strategies best serve to empower civil society and to 
spread constitutional values. Courts engaged in such strategies can use a range 
of tools that lie somewhere on a spectrum between strong-form and weak-form 
enforcement: drafting in civil society groups to monitor compliance and for-
mulate policy ideas, publicizing both constitutional issues and compliance 
failures, expanding access to the court for organizations, etc.7 All of these tools 
can be employed without having more dialogical exercises of review neces-
sarily collapse into a strong version of judicial supremacy. 
More broadly, a dynamic approach suggests an empirical agenda that 
should guide future work. Although much recent scholarship has studied the 
causes of judicial independence in difficult environments, very little scholar-
ship has considered the effects of judicial activism of different types. A dynam-
ic conception of judicial role places this question front and center, because it 
requires that both judges and scholars grapple with the question of how judi-
cial interventions of different types impact the evolution of democratic institu-
tions. It thus demands that judges consider both questions of plausibility and 
effectiveness. Plausibility concerns which strategies are likely to be possible in 
different political contexts, while effectiveness concerns which kinds of judi-
cial interventions are likely to have positive rather than negative impacts on 
democratic development. The theory’s ultimate value, therefore, is in asking a 
fresh set of questions about the judicial role. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Parts I and II develop the 
descriptive project by demonstrating both the problem of democratic dysfunc-
tion and a typology of the practices of constitutional courts and allied institu-
tions in improving democratic performance.8 I sort judicial action into three 
main boxes: tools designed to protect against democratic erosion, tools de-
signed to ameliorate weaknesses in political institutions, and attempts to build 
democratic spaces around political institutions by building up civil society and 
spreading constitutional culture.9 Part III develops the normative project, argu-
ing that a democracy-improving perspective is the most reasonable fit for this 
descriptive evidence, and that such a theory raises a new set of questions about 
                                                                                                                           
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 228 (2008) (arguing that “weak-form” or 
dialogic review offers the best way for courts to enforce socioeconomic rights). 
 7 See infra notes 258–287 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 13–173 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 86–173 and accompanying text. 
2014] A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role 1505 
judicial strategies and about the effects of different kinds of activism.10 Part IV 
demonstrates the theory in action by providing new perspectives on two live 
controversies in comparative constitutional law: the debate between propo-
nents of weak-form and strong-form review, and the problem of unconstitu-
tional constitutional amendments.11 The Conclusion argues that a dynamic the-
ory has the potential to guide a productive agenda for scholars interested in the 
very live problem of judicial role in newer or more fragile democracies.12 
I. DEMOCRATIC DYSFUNCTION & CONSTITUTIONAL PROJECTS 
This Part considers descriptive evidence about a particular set of chal-
lenges that tend to be faced by certain democracies of the “Global South.” 
These include at least three classes of problems: (1) problems of democratic 
fragility,13 (2) problems of democratic functioning,14 and (3) absence of consti-
tutional culture.15 Further, it presents evidence that these kinds of dysfunctions 
matter to constitutional designers, judges, and to the scholars focused on the 
constitutional systems under study.16 Neither claim, of course, is monolithic: 
the countries of the Global South, and more particularly the three countries 
focused on in the study, vary in important ways in terms of both the kinds of 
problems they face and the constitutional responses to those problems. So the 
claim here is a narrow one: the problem of democratic dysfunction—perhaps 
democratic irregularity—is a central concern of the constitutionalism of the 
countries under study. 
A. The Problems of Democratic Dysfunction 
As much recent political science work has documented, the category 
“democracy” is complex and possesses considerable variation.17 Many newer 
democracies suffer from several different kinds of problems with their political 
systems: (1) they are more likely to face erosion towards authoritarianism, or 
in other words are particularly “fragile”; (2) they suffer from problems in polit-
ical representation, accountability, and capacity that make them function poor-
ly even if they do not lead to democratic breakdown; and (3) they suffer from a 
general absence of constitutional culture—neither politicians nor the public 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See infra notes 174–254 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 255–325 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 326–327 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–35 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 36–57 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 70–85 and accompanying text. 
 17 For a classic study of the variation in the term “democracy,” see generally David Collier & 
Steven Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, 49 
WORLD POL. 430 (1997). 
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cares about constitutional values. This section addresses these three points in 
turn. 
First, though, two caveats. First, the list here is meant to be exemplary of 
problems faced by developing democracies, rather than comprehensive. Sec-
ond, the problems identified here represent differences of degree, and not of 
kind, with the problems faced by mature democracies. Some problems of dem-
ocratic dysfunction exist in all systems, but it would be a mistake for a theory 
of judicial role to ignore real differences between mature and developing de-
mocracies. 
1. The Problem of “Fragile” Democracy 
 Recent scholarship has focused on the problem of “fragile democra-
cies”—regimes that are particularly likely to fall back into some variant of au-
thoritarianism.18 Breakdowns of democracy into full-fledged authoritarianism, 
through military coup or similar device, are now rarer than they were in the 
past.19 But erosions into hybrid or competitive authoritarian regimes, which 
combine elements of democracy and authoritarianism, have become increas-
ingly common.20 A competitive authoritarian regime is democratic in the sense 
that elections are held and those elections are not outright shams, but it is au-
thoritarian in the sense that the playing field is systematically tilted in favor of 
incumbents.21 These incumbents use their control over institutions like the me-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, supra note 1, at 1406 (noting that “antidemocratic 
groups” may seek to use the democratic electoral system for their own benefit). Note, though, that 
Issacharoff is talking mostly about the susceptibility of democratic regimes to erosion or overthrow. 
See id. at 1408 (asking whether “democracies act not only to resist having their state authority con-
scripted to the cause of intolerance, but also, under certain circumstances, to ensure that their state 
apparatus not be captured wholesale for that purpose”). 
 19 See FREEDOM HOUSE, RELEASE BOOKLET, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2013: DEMOCRATIC 
BREAKTHROUGHS IN THE BALANCE 28 (2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/
default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C3GF-B7Q5 (noting that 
the percentage of countries classified as “not free” has dropped from forty-six percent in 1972 to 
twenty-four percent in 2012, but the percentage of countries classified as “partly free” has increased 
from twenty-five percent to thirty percent). 
 20 The literature originated in political science as an attempt to explain post-Cold War regime 
types that combined features of democracy and authoritarianism. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & LU-
CAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 3 (2010) 
(arguing that many transitions to democracy in the post-Cold War period have stopped at an interme-
diate point between democracy and authoritarianism); Andreas Schedler, The Logic of Electoral Au-
thoritarianism, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE COMPETITION 1 
(Andreas Schedler ed., 2006) (arguing that a number of regimes “have established the institutional 
facades of democracy, including regular multiparty elections for the chief executive, in order to con-
ceal (and reproduce) harsh realities of authoritarian governance”); Larry Diamond, Thinking About 
Hybrid Regimes, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 21–23 (noting that various regimes around the world 
like Russia, Turkey, and Venezuela appear to hold elections but yet are not truly democratic). 
 21 See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 20, at 6 (arguing that a “reasonably level playing field” 
requirement be added to definitions of democracy). 
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dia, judiciary, and electoral commissions, to make it unlikely they will actually 
lose elections even when the vote counting is fair.22 
It is relatively easy for some regimes to slip from being a democratic re-
gime to a hybrid regime, because a would-be autocrat need not adopt an obvi-
ously authoritarian constitution. Instead, they can merely take steps to pack or 
neutralize institutions that are supposed to act as a check, while making some 
relatively subtle legal changes to entrench their own power.23 I, and others, 
have described these kinds of democratic erosions in detail elsewhere.24 Here a 
few examples will suffice. 
 Recently in Latin America, presidents in Venezuela and Ecuador have re-
placed their existing constitutions with new ones in order to consolidate their 
power. In Venezuela, for example, President Hugo Chávez took office in 1999 
with a bare majority of votes, but faced opposition majorities in the Congress, 
Supreme Court, and at the subnational level.25 Without any express legal au-
thority, he convened a Constituent Assembly, elected in accordance with rules 
that marginalized the opposition, to replace the constitution.26 The new consti-
tutional order created a more powerful president and allowed Chávez to close 
down and repopulate existing institutions working against him.27 With his 
power consolidated, Chávez was able to push through successive constitutional 
amendments, most importantly one allowing him to remain in office indefinite-
ly.28 Chávez’s use of the tools of constitutional change did not eliminate the 
opposition, but it did allow him to gain significant advantages due to his con-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See id. at 9–12. 
 23 One example of the way this occurs is by amending constitutions to extend term limits. See 
infra note 294 and accompanying text; see also Tom Ginsburg et al., On the Evasion of Executive 
Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807, 1810–13 (2011). 
 24 See, e.g., Landau, supra note 1, at 200–11 (giving examples of regimes that have suffered from 
democratic erosion). 
 25 See, e.g., Michael Coppedge, Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty Versus Liberal Democracy, in 
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 165, 179 tbl.8.5 (Jorge I. 
Domínguez & Michael Shifter eds., 2d ed. 2003) (showing that the traditional parties still controlled 
clear majorities in Congress after Chávez was elected). 
 26 See Renata Segura & Ana María Bejarano, ¡Ni una asamblea más sin nosotros! Exclusion, 
Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 217, 228–30 
(2004) (noting that Chávez’s movement won sixty-five percent of votes, but because of the electoral 
rules, won about ninety-five percent of seats in the Assembly). 
 27 See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ 
AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT 57–60 (2010) (recounting how the Assembly used an assertion of 
“original constituent power” to shut down institutions including the Congress and the Supreme Court). 
 28 See Juan Forero, Chávez Wins Removal of Term Limits, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2009), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/15/AR2009021500136.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8XRV-Z6HR. 
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trol of the media, courts, and state patronage, and he was removed from power 
only with his death.29 
More recently, in Hungary, the right-wing party Fidesz took power, again 
with a bare majority of votes, but because of the voting rules won more than 
two-thirds of seats in Parliament.30 With this number of seats, and given the 
constitutional amendment and replacement rules in the Hungarian Constitu-
tion, it was able to amend or replace the existing constitution unilaterally.31 
The Fidesz party began by passing a series of constitutional amendments that 
weakened institutions designed to check its political power, such as the judici-
ary.32 A key amendment stripped the Hungarian Constitutional Court, a histori-
cally independent and powerful institution, of jurisdiction over laws dealing 
with fiscal and other important matters.33 Fidesz then moved forward with a 
wholesale replacement of the existing constitution; the new constitution weak-
ens the judiciary and other checking institutions, for example by altering selec-
tion rules.34 Many commentators argue that Fidesz has worked a significant 
erosion of democracy in Hungary by making itself harder to dislodge and by 
weakening checks on exercises of power.35 
2. Problems of Poorly-Functioning Democracy 
Beyond the threat of breakdown, newer democracies may also differ from 
more mature democracies along a related dimension: they may have systematic 
deficiencies in political representation, accountability, and capacity. The self-
perception of many emerging democratic regimes is not just that they are par-
ticularly prone to erosion or breakdown, but also that they do not function 
well. Representativeness refers to the question of whether elected officials ac-
tually push policies favored by their constituents; accountability refers to the 
question of whether voters and other institutions can punish political actors 
who either perform poorly or who exceed their powers; and capacity refers to 
the ability of political actors to gather information about social problems and 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Steven Levitsky & Lucan A. Way, Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 51, 61 (classifying Chávez-led Venezuela as a com-
petitive authoritarian regime). 
 30 See Miklós Bánkuti et al., Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the Constitution, J. DEMOCRA-
CY, July 2012, at 138–39 (describing Fidesz’s victory in 2010). 
 31 See id. at 142. 
 32 See id. at 143. 
 33 See Gábor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Courts as Guardians of the 
Constitution?, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182, 192 (2012). The amendment was challenged in front of the 
constitutional court as an unconstitutional constitutional amendment, but the Court refused to utilize 
such a doctrine to strike down the amendment. See id. at 194–97. 
 34 See Bánkuti et al., supra note 30, at 142–44 (describing the new constitution and its process of 
approval). 
 35 See, e.g., id. at 144. 
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to formulate effective policy responses to them.36 Political scientists tend to 
attribute some problems along all three dimensions to defects in party systems, 
and more particularly to two types of systems commonly seen in the develop-
ing world: the non-institutionalized (or weak) party system and the dominant-
party system. 
A non-institutionalized party system is one where parties lack durable 
roots in society.37 Thus, within these systems, parties turn over quickly, chang-
ing their share of the vote and even disappearing with great frequency.38 Parties 
in these kinds of systems often have weak or non-existent ideological plat-
forms, with personality replacing policy as a key determinant of votes.39 New-
er party systems in countries that have experienced democratic transitions of-
ten have non-institutionalized party systems because organizing stable and co-
herent parties is a task that takes time.40 Parties need to establish internal struc-
tures, links with outside groups like unions and business organizations, and a 
reputation for effectiveness at carrying out a certain political agenda—none of 
these tasks can be undertaken instantaneously. In the absence of organization, 
actors form parties around individual personalities or irrelevant issues: a fa-
mous example is the Beer Lovers party that formed in Poland following the 
democratic transition.41 New democracies like Egypt may thus be relatively 
unlikely to have institutionalized party systems.42 Further, party systems can 
deinstitutionalize even in systems that once had stable and well-defined party 
systems, particularly where voters lose confidence in the legitimacy of existing 
political structures. Colombia and Venezuela offer two examples from recent 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See Michael Shifter, Emerging Trends and Determining Factors in Democratic Governance, in 
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 25, at 3, 5 (discussing 
Latin America’s “tremendous democratic deficits on a variety of fronts”). 
 37 For the classic treatment in the political science literature, see Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. 
Scully, Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America, in BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: 
PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 4–6 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully eds., 1995). 
 38 See id. at 7–8 (comparing the volatility of voting patterns across different Latin American 
countries). 
 39 See id. at 5 (noting that in non-institutionalized party systems, “more citizens have trouble 
locating what the major parties represent even in the broadest terms,” and that these systems undergo 
frequent “[c]hanges in relative ideological position”). 
 40 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 422–25 (1968) 
(arguing that party systems are often weak and non-institutionalized in new democracies). 
 41 See, e.g., Stanisław Gebethner, Parliamentary and Electoral Parties in Poland, in PARTY 
STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE 120, 121, 122 (Paul G. Lewis ed., 1996) 
(attributing the moderate success of the Beer Lover’s party to pervasive distrust of any political party 
following the fall of socialism). 
 42 See, e.g., Marwan Muasher, The Path to Sustainable Political Parties in the Arab World, CAR-
NEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE 2 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/
13/path-to-sustainable-political-parties-in-arab-world, archived at http://perma.cc/R3PC-J3UY (not-
ing the difficulty that new Egyptian parties have had in getting organized and noting the asymmetry 
between the newer parties, which are disorganized, and forces like the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
have had a long time to organize). 
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Latin American history where once-institutionalized party systems dissolved, 
leaving a vacuum.43 
Non-institutionalized party systems lead to problems of representation 
because the absence of clear platforms or durable parties obscures links be-
tween voters and elected officials, and thus policy made by elected officials 
need not represent the public will.44 Further, they may lead to accountability 
problems, primarily because elected officials are not rooted in strong party or-
ganizations. For example, presidential or semi-presidential regimes with non-
institutionalized party systems tend to elect outsiders as chief executives, and 
these outsiders may be difficult for either legislatures or other institutions like 
courts to control.45 The relatively recent cases of Álvaro Uribe in Colombia, 
Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru 
all demonstrate how non-institutionalized or deinstitutionalizing party systems 
tend to produce political outsiders as presidents, and how these outsiders may 
threaten at least horizontal mechanisms of political accountability.46 Finally, 
non-institutionalized party systems may be correlated with weaknesses in ca-
pacity. This is easiest to see in the case of legislatures: a legislature composed 
of small, personalist parties and high turnover is unlikely to acquire the exper-
tise to either develop policy or to supervise the executive’s initiatives.47 In oth-
er words, a legislature in a non-institutionalized party system is more likely to 
seek to “abdicate” its powers than to “empire build.”48 
                                                                                                                           
 43 In Colombia, a stable two-party system broke down in the 1990s as voters became disenchant-
ed with traditional political institutions: an institutionalized party system was replaced with an incho-
ate party system with personalist parties. See Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, Giants with Feet of Clay: 
Political Parties in Colombia, in THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ANDES 78, 
78–79 (Scott Mainwaring et al. eds., 2006). In Venezuela, a similarly stable two-party system implod-
ed quickly and was replaced with a vacuum that was filled by Hugo Chávez and his movement. See 
Coppedge, supra note 25, at 167, 182–83. 
 44 See Mainwaring & Scully, supra note 37, at 5 (noting that non-institutionalized party systems 
lack strong “linkages between citizens and parties”). 
 45 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1994, at 55, 60 (noting 
how elected presidents operating in non-institutionalized party systems sometimes run on platforms 
where they put themselves above politics and outside of political parties). 
 46 See, e.g., Maxwell A. Cameron, The State of Democracy in the Andes: Introduction to a The-
matic Issue of Revista de Ciencia Política, 30 REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA 5, 9–13 (2010) (tracing 
trends across different countries in the Andean region). 
 47 See, e.g., Scott Morgenstern, Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America, in LEGISLATIVE 
POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 413, 431 (Scott Morgenstern & Benito Nacif eds., 2002) (arguing and 
providing evidence for the proposition that “only cohesive opposition parties—or coalitions—with 
majority control will have the means, method, and incentive to assert legislative authority”). 
 48 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 920 (2005) (noting that the assumption that political institutions are out to expand their 
power rather than abdicate is an often-false assumption even of United States constitutional law). 
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Dominant-party systems form a second, somewhat different kind of prob-
lem common in the developing world.49 In these systems, a single party tends 
to win most elections. This is a common problem: Mexico was a dominant-
party system for most of the prior century; India had this kind of system for 
much of its democratic history; South Africa—along with much of the rest of 
Africa—has this kind of system today; and Turkey may be evolving into such a 
system.50 These systems emerge where the organizational problems left unre-
solved in the non-institutionalized system case are resolved, but in an asym-
metric way: one party or movement grabs most of the organizational re-
sources.51 Once established, these sorts of systems may be difficult to dislodge 
because the incumbents will gain enormous advantages in terms of resources 
and organization over their opponents.52 
Thus, dominant-party systems again raise challenges along the three di-
mensions of representation, accountability, and capacity. There is a possibility 
that some groups of voters not part of the coalitions for the winning party will 
get permanently frozen out. When this happens, the dominant party has no in-
centive to represent the interests of losing parties, and opposition groups will 
be unable to do so.53 Further, the fact that the same party is virtually guaran-
teed to win every election may weaken the accountability between political 
leaders and voters; a party virtually guaranteed to win the next election has 
fewer incentives to pay attention to even the voters composing its coalition.54 
The dominance of a single party will also lead to predictable problems with 
horizontal accountability: control institutions like ombudsmen and comptrol-
lers may be packed by members of the dominant party rather than having the 
necessary independence.55 Finally, these systems may beget problems of bu-
                                                                                                                           
 49 For an overview to the theoretical issues within the particular context of South Africa, see Sujit 
Choudhry, “He Had a Mandate”; The South African Constitutional Court and the African National 
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy, 2 CONST. CT. REV. 1, 8–19 (2009) (S. Afr.). 
 50 See generally Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins, The Dominant Party Regimes of South 
Africa, Mexico, Taiwan, and Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE: 
ONE-PARTY DOMINATION AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins eds., 1999) 
(providing an overview of these different regimes). 
 51 See, e.g., LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 20, at 56 (noting that hybrid regimes, which usually 
consist of one-party dominant regimes, are a solution to problems of political disorganization and, 
themselves, rely on organization to survive). 
 52 See id. at 9–12. 
 53 See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 50, at 40–41. 
 54 See Steven Friedman, No Easy Stroll to Dominance: Party Dominance, Opposition and Civil 
Society in South Africa, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE: ONE-PARTY DOMINATION AND DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 50, at 97, 106–07. 
 55 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Democratic Risk to Democratic Transitions, 5 CONST. CT. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (S. Afr.) (noting the ways in which the dominant-party ANC in South Africa 
is able to undermine institutions that are supposed to check it). 
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reaucratic capacity, in some cases by allowing corruption to flourish and to 
influence appointments and behavior with the bureaucracy.56 
It is worth noting that serious problems of representation, accountability, 
and capacity often exist even without these particular configurations in party 
systems. Capacity, for example, is often weak in newer democracies just be-
cause it takes considerable time and resources to build up competent bureau-
crats. Pervasive problems of corruption, which run across a large number of 
less mature democracies, also impact the quality of representation and the ex-
tent of accountability by weakening the links between voters and officials and 
by allowing officials to weaken horizontal checks on their own power.57 
3. Problems of Constitutional Culture 
Finally, many theories of American constitutionalism rest at base on the 
notion that the “people” care about the constitution and its meaning—in other 
words, that the constitution is taken seriously as an object of social and politi-
cal discourse.58 This conception obviously lies at the root of the “popular con-
stitutionalist” movement in the United States. The main animating principle of 
this movement is that at least some power of constitutional interpretation 
should be taken away from the judiciary and given to the people, either exer-
cised directly or through their political representatives.59 Yet this idea that con-
stitutional principles should be realized in the political realm, rather than 
through judicial elaboration, requires an assumption that members of the pub-
lic themselves care about constitutionalism.60 Much of the case for reining in 
judiciaries in the name of popular constitutionalism depends, then, on the ex-
istence of constitutional culture. 
This assumption is very plausible in the United States, which has a long 
history of carrying on political disputes as fights about the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                           
 56 For how similar problems could manifest with an entrenched executive rather than a party, see 
infra notes 294–296 and accompanying text (discussing the potential threat that could have been 
posed by Colombian President Uribe taking a third term and abusing his powers of appointment). 
 57 See Kanybek Nur-tegin & Hans J. Czap, Corruption: Democracy, Autocracy, and Political 
Stability, 42 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 51, 51, 58, 62–63 (2012) (finding that levels of corruption in 
unstable democracies are high, although lower than in autocratic regimes). 
 58 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 59 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 106–10 (2004) (arguing for a version of departmentalism, where each branch of 
government would have its own power of constitutional interpretation); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 193–94 (1999) (arguing that the development of constitu-
tional meaning should be left primarily in the hands of political rather than judicial actors); Tom Don-
nelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 180–94 (searching for ways 
to allow popular constitutionalism to be implemented as part of a practical reform program in the 
United States). 
 60 See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 2255. 
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Constitution.61 Some other mature democracies (although not all) have similar-
ly robust constitutional cultures.62 But—although systematic empirical study is 
almost non-existent—the assumption seems to break down in many new de-
mocracies. Some of these systems are new to democratic constitutionalism and 
thus have little history or experience internalizing constitutional values. Others 
have a history of living under “sham constitutionalism”—documents that pur-
ported to create liberal democracies, but are in fact widely ignored or ineffec-
tual.63 Finally, some have experienced a dizzying array of constitutions in suc-
cession, with none of the texts seeming to have much meaning or real-world 
impact.64 Constitutions in these circumstances still play valuable functions. 
They may, for example, help elites solve coordination games involving which 
actor gets to wield which type of power. But they are not likely to serve as a 
widely-known source of national values, at least not initially.65 
The typology of different dysfunctions outlined here suggests a series of 
independent but related problems with democratic functioning. First, newer 
democracies often suffer from very high risks that political action will endan-
ger democracy itself—they are particularly fragile.66 Second, newer democra-
cies often have political institutions that do not effectively channel the will of 
the people—they are poorly-functioning.67 And third, the public itself often 
does not care much about constitutional meaning and will therefore presuma-
bly not pressure political actors into making decisions based on constitutional 
meaning.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61 For an account of the construction of this constitutional culture in the first generation of the 
independent United States, see Jason Mazzone, The Creation of a Constitutional Culture, 40 TULSA 
L. REV. 671, 672 (2005) (describing how civic associations served as a key agent for inculcating con-
stitutional values to ordinary people). 
 62 In Germany, for example, recent scholarship has traced the rise of “constitutional patriotism” in 
the post-war period. See Jan-Werner Müller, On the Origins of Constitutional Patriotism, 5 CONTEMP. 
POL. THEORY 278, 279 (2006) (arguing that Germans view their Constitution as the “focal point of 
democratic loyalty”). 
 63 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 864 (2013) 
(measuring the match between constitutional text and actual compliance with constitutional norms, 
and finding the highest levels of divergence in Asia and Africa). 
 64 See, e.g., Miguel Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 34 (2006) (finding that Latin American constitutions were designed to be “flexible” 
so as to suit elite interests but never captured “broad citizen support”); Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, 
Wiki-Constitutionalism, NEW REPUBLIC (May 25, 2010), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/
75150/wiki-constitutionalism, archived at http://perma.cc/9JXM-CDJ2 (noting the excessive numbers 
of constitutions in many Latin American countries). 
 65 See Schor, supra note 64, at 34. 
 66 See supra notes 18–35 and accompanying text. 
 67 See supra notes 36–57 and accompanying text. 
 68 See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
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B. Judicial Perception and Constitutional Design  
in Dysfunctional Democracies 
A key question is how judges, scholars, and constitutional designers with-
in nascent democracies have analyzed these problems internally. Most realistic 
efforts at normative constitutional theory should build on this self-perception. 
Indeed, scholars and judges working on developing countries do cite and rely 
on perception of problems in their own democratic systems, and constitutional 
design has been attuned to these problems.69 Judges (as well as citizens and 
constitutional designers) can, and sometimes do, overstate the problems with 
their own political systems. But it is relevant to any conception of the judicial 
role that judges, scholars, and constitutional designers recognize defects in 
their own political systems.  
The Indian and Colombian high court justices have been particularly clear 
in this regard. In Colombia, Constitutional Court justices openly treat the 
weaknesses in political institutions—and particularly in the Congress—as a 
justification for their choice to take on a protagonist’s role. In one famous de-
cision striking down a national security law because of weaknesses in demo-
cratic deliberation, the Court complained that the Congress “should be” a 
“space of public reason.”70 In another case striking down a tax reform, the 
Court noted that a measure expanding the VAT tax to basic necessities had not 
been the product of “a minimum of rational deliberation.”71 One justice, point-
ing across the main square in Bogotá from the Constitutional Court, explained 
that the Court, rather than the Congress, is the center of public protest, because 
the Court “has more relevance to people’s lives.”72 
Likewise, Nick Robinson argues that the Indian Supreme Court’s percep-
tion of systematic problems in elected democratic institutions has led it to seek 
an expanded mandate and to become a kind of “good governance court.”73 For 
example, then-Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan stated that arguments in favor 
of judicial restraint “fail[] to recognize the constant failures of governance tak-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See, e.g., infra notes 153–154 and accompanying text (describing a “state of unconstitutional 
conditions” that was declared by the Colombian Constitutional Court in response to a housing crisis). 
 70 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 30, 2004, Sentencia C-816/04, 
§ VII.138, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/c-816-04.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/4R99-HGY8 (“Congress is a space of public reason. Or at least the Constitution 
postulates that it should be.”) (author’s translation). 
 71 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 9, 2003, Sentencia C-776/03, 
§ VII.4.5.6.1, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2003/c-776-03.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/495S-6XL5 (author’s translation). 
 72 Interview with Constitutional Court Justice, in Bogotá, Colom. (Aug. 20, 2009) (notes and 
contact information on file with author). Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter the judge 
interviewed requested anonymity. The interviewee does not endorse my analysis or conclusions, nor is 
the interviewee responsible for any errors I may have made. 
 73 See Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 
8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 8–17 (2009). 
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ing place at the hands of the other organs of State, and that it is the function of 
the Court to check, balance and correct any failure arising out of any other 
State organ.”74 In both of these systems, the justices are giving voice to broad-
ly-felt perceptions about the low quality of democratic institutions. 
The situation in South Africa is somewhat different: there, sets of scholars 
surrounding the Court, rather than the Court itself, have focused on the prob-
lems of dominant-party democracy. These scholars have focused on the exist-
ence of a dominant party as one of the fundamental challenges faced by the 
Court, and have analyzed both the extent to which it limits the Court’s range of 
options and the ability of the Court to mitigate some of its byproducts.75 
The perception of inadequate or flawed representative institutions is also 
a core principle of constitutional design across a range of new democracies.76 
First, it drives a relatively “thick” approach to constitutional drafting. Constitu-
tional framers in new democracies often write lengthy constitutions detailing a 
large number of rights and delving deep into the details of constitutional struc-
ture and functioning. Although some commentators view these kinds of consti-
tutional texts as aberrational or as improper constitutions, they may arguably 
be a rational reaction to the distrust of democratic institutions.77 Adopting de-
tailed texts is a way to hem in and limit the power of democratic actors. 
Moreover, distrust of democratic institutions leads constitutional design-
ers to create a series of independent institutions designed to check and control 
elected actors. That is, although judicial review has become a standard institu-
tion almost everywhere, constitutional designers in newer democracies have 
found that judicial review alone is not enough.78 They thus also create other 
institutions, like anticorruption commissions, ombudsmen, electoral courts and 
commissions, human rights commissions, independent prosecutors, independ-
ent comptrollers, etc.79 The proliferation of these institutions is one of the most 
important—and least studied or understood—trends in constitutional design.80 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Id. at 16–17. 
 75 See, e.g., infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the South African Constitutional 
Court’s difficulties operating in a dominant party system). 
 76 See supra notes 36–57 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of poorly-functioning 
democracies). 
 77 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Parliamentary Supplements (or Why Democracies Need More Than 
Parliaments), 89 B.U. L. REV. 795, 805 (2009) (noting that modern constitutions are often thick doc-
uments, providing a series of restraints on both elected representatives and on the checking institutions 
themselves). 
 78 See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 687–88 (2000) 
(calling on constitutional theorists to think about the possibility for institutions beyond parliaments 
and courts). 
 79 See Scheppele, supra note 77, at 823–24 (discussing the different kinds of institutions that are 
found in modern constitutions in the developing world); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judi-
ciary (or, Why Courts Can Be More Democratic than Parliaments), in RETHINKING THE RULE OF 
LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 25, 37–38 (Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Scheppele, De-
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 According to one scholar, these independent non-judicial institutions act 
as advisory counterparts to constitutional courts.81 In other words, they soften 
the tension between democracy and judicial review by vesting review-like 
powers in institutions that lack the coercive powers of courts.82 But in many 
cases, these non-judicial independent agencies have as sweeping a set of pow-
ers (within their designated domain) as constitutional courts. For example, an-
ti-corruption commissions often have full powers to remove and prosecute 
public officials.83 Electoral courts and commissions can often take independent 
action to determine elections and to sanction wrongdoing.84 Moreover, these 
independent institutions are often designed in addition to—rather than as a re-
placement for—an activist constitutional court. This has been the pattern, for 
example, in systems as diverse as Hungary, India, and Colombia.85 This sug-
gests that rather than viewing these institutions as a way to weaken the checks 
placed on democratic officials, they should instead be viewed as an additional 
manifestation of democratic distrust. 
                                                                                                                           
mocracy by Judiciary] (linking the adoption of thick constitutions and the rise of constitutional courts 
to distrust of democracy in the post-communist states). 
 80 See Ackerman, supra note 78, at 690 (noting that this area is one where “the creative potential 
of constitutional law has been egregiously underappreciated”). 
 81 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 DUKE L.J. 
953, 955 (2007) (noting that many of these institutions have purely advisory powers, although others 
may have some coercive powers). Elmendorf’s classification accurately describes the functioning of 
some of these institutions, especially in the developed world. See id. at 961–64 (discussing National 
Human Rights Institutions in Europe and elsewhere). 
 82 See id. at 955. 
 83 See JOHN R. HEILBRUNN, WORLD BANK INSTITUTE, ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS: PAN-
ACEA OR REAL MEDICINE TO FIGHT CORRUPTION? 4 (2004), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6VXG-LL78 
(noting the extraordinary investigative and coercive powers of the Hong Kong anti-corruption com-
mission over a range of different issues). 
 84 See, e.g., Robert A. Pastor, A Brief History of Electoral Commissions, in THE SELF-
RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 75, 78–79 (Andreas 
Schedler et al. eds., 1999) (noting the sweeping powers of electoral commissions and courts in Costa 
Rica and India). 
 85 See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional Law, 
51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 338–39 (2010) (noting that the Colombian Constitution of 1991 created 
powerful institutions like a Human Rights Ombudsman, as well as a powerful Constitutional Court, 
because of “a suspicion that existing structures would not adequately enforce the constitution and 
transform Colombian society”); Robinson, supra note 73, at 17 (noting that the founders of Indian 
democracy “set up a series of independent unelected bodies,” including a national election commis-
sion, comptroller, finance commission, auditor general, and public service commissions at all levels of 
government, as well as a powerful court); cf. Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary, supra note 79, at 40 
(discussing the role of the Hungarian Constitutional Court as a checking institution as a response to 
democratic distrust). 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND DYSFUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACIES 
The last Part took a sociological look at the attitudes of three sets of rele-
vant actors—judges, scholars, and constitutional designers— and this one 
looks particularly at the jurisprudence of constitutional courts. The aim here is 
to show that the conception that exercises of judicial review should be for-
ward-looking and aimed at improving the performance of political institutions 
through time is relevant to the practices of courts in some fragile democracies. 
This Part assembles evidence that such a conception exists, and classifies exer-
cises of judicial review into three main camps: efforts to ensure democratic 
survival,86 efforts to build up democratic institutions and to fix problems with 
political systems,87 and efforts to work around existing political institutions by 
opening up alternative spaces of democratic contestation.88 The evidence is 
again drawn primarily, but not exclusively, from the courts of South Africa, 
Colombia, and India. 
Beyond description and classification, this Part demonstrates that a dy-
namic perspective on judicial review is helpful in raising questions for evaluat-
ing the exercises of judicial review surveyed here.89 That is, a dynamic per-
spective on judicial review is not a blank check for courts in the developing 
world, but instead suggests a different set of limitations on constitutional 
courts. I treat these questions, and potential responses to them, in a more com-
plete way in Part III.90 
A. Preserving Democracy 
Legal scholars and constitutional designers have envisioned a number of 
different responses to the threat of democratic erosion. As noted above in Part 
I, new democracies are often viewed as particularly vulnerable to backsliding 
into a variant of authoritarianism.91 I discuss two of these variations here: the 
militant democracy model,92 which allows courts to ban problematic parties, 
and judicial control of the tools of constitutional change.93 Both of these insti-
tutional designs and legal doctrines appear to rest on skepticism about whether 
maneuvers with significant political or popular support at a given point in time 
actually reflect the durable popular coalition that should be involved in large-
scale political change; in other words, they reflect skepticism about the quality 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See infra notes 91–107 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 108–150 and accompanying text. 
 88 See infra notes 152–173 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 91–173 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 174–254 and accompanying text. 
 91 See supra notes 17–35 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 93 See infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text. 
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of democracy at the present. The argument is that it is relatively easy for a po-
litical force or leader to leverage a temporary spike in popularity and to make 
it appear to be a durable mandate for sweeping change.94 Further, certain types 
of constitutional change can do lasting damage to a political system, putting a 
regime on a less democratic path indefinitely.95 Together, these two factors jus-
tify extraordinary restrictions on democracy in the present, in the name of pre-
serving and improving it for the future. 
The oldest of these mechanisms, the “militant democracy” conception de-
veloped in post-war Germany, focuses largely on the banning of parties which 
pose a threat to the democratic order, a power normally placed in Constitution-
al Courts.96 The idea is that parties that are clearly anti-democratic and pursue 
anti-democratic ends should not be able to come to power from within the 
democratic order. The model for this practice, of course, is the interwar Wei-
mar Republic, where the Nazis came to power largely using democratic means, 
beginning as a very small party and gaining strength for their anti-system ide-
ology as the major parties failed to stabilize the economy and government.97 
The key question is whether banning parties is a helpful response for preserv-
ing democracy, particularly against the modern threat of democratic backslid-
ing into a competitive authoritarian or hybrid regime. Some evidence—
admittedly limited—suggests that it may not be.98 
More recent work in constitutional theory has focused instead on design-
ing the tools of constitutional change so as to be robust against the threat of 
abuse.99 Constitutional designers in recent constitutions have often created ti-
ers of constitutional amendment in the text itself, making certain sensitive pro-
                                                                                                                           
 94 See, e.g., David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 936 (2013) 
(noting that in many instances of constitution-making, there is a significant risk that powerful actors 
will use the moment to entrench their power); William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-
Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 193, 196 (2012) (finding, based on a study of Eastern European and 
post-Soviet states, that certain models of constitution-making “have helped charismatic presidents 
unilaterally impose authoritarian constitutions on society”); Varol, supra note 1, at 433 (arguing that 
the use of temporary constitutions can ameliorate some of the risks of groups taking advantage of 
moments of constitutional change to entrench their own power). 
 95 See, e.g., Landau, supra note 1, at 189; Partlett, supra note 94, at 193–96, 237–38 (finding that 
the shape of constitution-making processes had lasting effects on constitutional orders). 
 96 See Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, supra note 1, at 1408–09 (describing the militant de-
mocracy conception); see also Giovanni Capoccia, Militant Democracy: The Institutional Bases of 
Democratic Self-Preservation, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 207, 208–10 (2013) (giving a historical 
overview of the concept and explaining renewed interest in it). 
 97 See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 10–
13 (1995) (explaining the rise of the Nazi party from within the Constitution of the Weimar Republic). 
 98 See infra notes 243–247 and accompanying text (discussing the aftermath of Turkey’s attempt 
to ban parties). 
 99 See infra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
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visions either particularly difficult or even impossible to change.100 For exam-
ple, the Honduran Constitution makes its one-term limit on presidential terms 
unamendable, and penalizes even proposals to change that provision.101 Less 
dramatically, the South African Constitution requires increased super-
majorities for some kinds of constitutional changes as opposed to others.102 
One possible purpose of these kinds of tiered provisions is to protect constitu-
tional norms, like term limits, that are particularly likely to be abused and to 
lead to democratic erosion.103 
In an increasing number of countries, courts have invented this doctrine 
on their own, arguing that the “basic structure” or “fundamental principles” of 
the constitution may not be changed by amending the constitution.104 This doc-
trine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments is, for most American law-
yers, a stunning display of judicial overreach, but it has been adopted by courts 
in countries including India, Colombia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Portugal, the Czech Republic, Taiwan, and Peru.105 Uses in Colombia and India 
suggest that it may have at least limited value in protecting democracy against 
some kinds of threats.106 
The case of institutions designed to protect the survival of fragile democ-
racies raises perhaps the most dramatic conflict between traditional constitu-
tional theory and the dynamic approach.107 Both party-banning and the uncon-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 708–10 (2010) (noting 
the use of constitutional tiers that require increasingly more demanding super-majorities for amend-
ment, and recommending this device as an alternative to making some provisions completely una-
mendable). 
 101 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Vicki Jackson, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interventions in 
Domestic Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 176–78 (2013) (explaining the 
design of the Honduran Constitution and its role in provoking a constitutional crisis and military coup 
in 2009). 
 102 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74 (requiring that most amendments receive only a two-thirds 
majority of Parliament and, in some cases, super-majority approval of the National Council of Prov-
inces, but requiring a three-quarters majority of Parliament for amendments to Chapter 1 of the Con-
stitution). 
 103 This was precisely the use of the unamendable provision in Honduras. See Dixon & Jackson, 
supra note 101, at 176–78. 
 104 See, e.g., Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and 
Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 659 (2013) (noting that the issue of uncon-
stitutional constitutional amendments has already been litigated in “numerous countries”). 
 105 See id. at 677–99 (giving an overview of usage across a broad range of countries). 
 106 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited 
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment 1–3 (unpublished manuscript), archived at 
http://perma.cc/X4PW-P2TM. 
 107 There are yet more dramatic examples of such a conflict. Some scholars have suggested a 
constitutional role for the military as a protector of democratic stability in fragile regimes. See Ozan 
O. Varol, The Military as the Guardian of Constitutional Democracy, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
547, 547 (2013) (arguing that militaries can at times promote rather than hinder democratic develop-
ment in fragile regimes). The key to the logic is the observation that a military role in the constitution-
al order need not be antithetical to democracy; under some conditions militaries have promoted de-
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stitutional constitutional amendments doctrine are very difficult to square with 
most standard approaches to constitutional theory, because they involve ex-
traordinary restrictions on the democracy of the present. The “militant democ-
racy” model of party banning reduces the scope of political competition and 
prevents some political forces from contesting political office. And the uncon-
stitutional constitutional amendments doctrine prevents even large super-
majorities from carrying out certain political changes without either packing 
the court or, perhaps, by conducting a wholesale constitutional replacement. 
But both emerge as potentially vital tools to protect and preserve the democra-
cy of the future; thus a dynamic perspective emerges as the best potential de-
fense of both doctrines. 
B. Insider Strategies: Working to Improve Democratic Institutions 
Beyond preserving democracy, some courts also focus on improving the 
performance of democratic institutions through time. The sheer number of pos-
sible approaches makes it impossible to give a complete accounting here. In-
stead, this Section focuses on giving examples of approaches that have been 
used in two well-studied constitutional courts: (1) the Colombian Constitution-
al Court, which has focused on problems found in a non-institutionalized party 
system with a correspondingly overreaching executive,108 and (2) the ap-
proaches of the South African Constitutional Court, which has focused on 
problems found within a dominant-party system.109 
1. Colombia and Deinstitutionalized Party Systems 
The Colombian Constitutional Court is faced with an arguably de-insti-
tutionalized party system.110 Parties are weak, turn over frequently, and lack 
clear policy platforms.111 Further, the Colombian Congress is widely viewed as 
corrupt, with legislators more interested in achieving personal gain for them-
                                                                                                                           
mocratization. The military may in fact be especially effective at defending against threats of demo-
cratic erosion from within: judicial decisions may be ignored (or judiciaries packed), but military 
power is much more difficult to evade. See id. at 579–80 (noting that judicial decisions can more easi-
ly be ignored). Turkey, where the military had a long history of stepping in to protect the democratic 
order against the perceived threat of Islamist political forces, is often held up as a model for this type 
of constitutional design. See id. at 597–605; see also Ozan O. Varol, The Turkish “Model” of Civil-
Military Relations, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 727, 727 (2013) (critically examining moments where the 
Turkish military has played a pro-democratic versus anti-democratic role in Turkish politics).  
 108 See infra notes 110–138 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 139–150 and accompanying text. 
 110 See, e.g., Leongómez, supra note 43, at 80 (stating that the Colombian party system was going 
through a “rapid de-institutionalization process”). 
 111 See id. at 83–85. 
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selves or their backers than in pursuing national policy initiatives.112 The result 
of these two factors has been a Congress that is very weak in carrying out the 
core functions of lawmaking or checking executive power. This legislative 
weakness is matched by a correspondingly very powerful president that is 
largely unchecked by other elected officials.113 The Court and other actors 
within the political system, broadly speaking, have taken two approaches to 
these mirror-image problems. First, they have sought to improve the perfor-
mance of the weaker institution (the Congress) by cleansing it and by attempt-
ing to force it to become more interested in policy.114 Second, they have sought 
to close the accountability gap by essentially replacing the congressional role 
in checking an overreaching executive.115 
Colombian institutions have, first, responded to the perceptions of corrup-
tion in the Colombian system in the simplest way imaginable: by seeking to 
oust corrupt or incompetent officials.116 The Colombian Constitution includes 
a number of institutions aimed at removing and jailing politicians, particularly 
legislators, which are perceived by the population as hopelessly corrupt and 
ineffective. A Procuraduria (Attorney General) has the power to discipline, 
remove, and impose future political bans on elected and non-elected actors for 
a wide range of faults.117 The Prosecutor’s Office has the power to recommend 
criminal charges to the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, which can 
jail high officials.118 The Comptroller audits state institutions regularly and 
broadly.119 Other constitutional designs in new democracies tend to have simi-
larly robust sets of institutions charged with cleansing politics.120 
These control institutions have had an incredible impact on Colombian 
politics: in the 2006–2010 term, about one-third of all elected congressmen 
were investigated and over fifteen percent actually jailed for their links to par-
amilitary groups.121 Most of these investigations were based on allegations of 
links or dealings with paramilitary groups. Moreover, the theories of removal 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See id. at 91–93 (explaining how the de-institutionalized party system and other factors impact 
the behavior of the Colombian Congress). 
 113 See, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny, The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordi-
nary Powers in Colombia, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION, no. 4, 2003, at 51–52 (emphasizing the extent to 
which Colombian Presidents have historically ruled by using their emergency powers). 
 114 See infra notes 116–124 and accompanying text. 
 115 Uprimny, supra note 113, at 53–60 (discussing the Court’s attempts to check presidential 
emergency powers). 
 116 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 117 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOM. [C.P.] arts. 275–278. 
 118 Id. arts. 249–251. 
 119 Id. arts. 267–268. 
 120 See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 77, at 823–24 (giving examples of a number of different types 
of cleansing institutions). 
 121 See Claudia López & Óscar Sevillano, Balance político de la parapolítica, ARCANOS, Dec. 
2008, at 62, 62–66 (Colom.), available at http://www.arcoiris.com.co/wp-content/uploads/2011/
arcanos/revista_ARCANOS_14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HPG6-4HAG. 
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extend well beyond criminal matters and outright corruption. In 2013, for ex-
ample, the national Attorney General utilized his broad powers to remove the 
elected mayor of Bogotá, Gustavo Petro, on the grounds that Petro had handled 
a proposed shift from private to public garbage vendors in an incompetent 
manner.122 Petro was also banned from future participation in politics for fif-
teen years. Importantly, the allegations against Petro were not based on corrup-
tion, but on poor performance.123 Although the national President later reinstat-
ed Petro, some commentators in the aftermath of the removal referred to the 
national Attorney General—an unelected institution charged with monitoring 
politicians and bureaucrats—as the most powerful person in the country.124 
Beyond cleansing, the Court and its allied institutions have also sought to 
improve the legislative performance of the Congress. For example, they have 
imposed strict limits on the kind of lawmaking power that the Congress can 
delegate to the President, a species of non-delegation doctrine.125 Similarly, the 
Colombian Court has attempted to improve the quality of legislative delibera-
tion by constitutionalizing some issues of legislative procedure. When the leg-
islature fails to debate a key issue at all stages of debate, for example because a 
provision is added as part of an amendment very late in the legislative process, 
the Court will strike down the resulting law.126 
A textbook example of the Court’s attempts to “fix” the Congress came 
out of the critically-important 2003 case C-816/04, where the Colombia Con-
stitutional Court examined the constitutionality of, and struck down, a legisla-
tive amendment that formed part of then-President Uribe’s signature program 
on national security.127 The amendment would have allowed Uribe to enact 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See William Newman, Mayor Ousted in Colombia After Claims of Bungling, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Dec. 9, 2013), at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/world/americas/mayor-
ousted-in-colombia-after-claims-of-bungling.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CD2U-F47C. 
 123 See id. (noting that the core allegation was that Petro had made “serious mistakes in his han-
dling of the botched transfer of garbage collection from private contractors to a government-run ser-
vice”). 
 124 See Ordóñez, ¿el hombre más poderoso de Colombia?, SEMANA (Dec. 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/ordonez-es-el-hombre-mas-poderoso-de-colombia/367790-3, 
archived at http://perma.cc/B7ZN-M3CL (Colom.). 
 125 The core tool here is a requirement that delegations be relatively precise. See, e.g., Corte Con-
stitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 11, 2003, Sentencia C-097/03, available at http://
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2003/c-097-03.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/G5V-
4SKW. 
 126 This is called the “elusion of debate” doctrine. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitu-
tional Court], agosto 10, 2004, Sentencia C-754/04, § VII, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.
gov.co/relatoria/2004/c-754-04.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/LC8P-3PWD (striking down parts of an 
important bill reducing pension payouts). 
 127 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 30, 2004, Sentencia C-816/04, 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/c-816-04.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/7N7-7NG5; see also Gonzalo A. Ramírez Cleves, El control material de las reformas con-
stitucionales mediante acto legislativo: A partir de la jurisprudencia establecida en la Sentencia C-
551 de 2003, 18 REVISTA DERECHO DEL ESTADO 3, 17–18 (2006), available at http://dialnet.unirioja.
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sweeping anti-guerrilla measures. The Court struck the amendment down on 
procedural grounds, holding that its passage through the Congress had been 
improper. It focused on the fact that the President appeared to have interfered 
in the congressional procedure for passage of the law. The Court noted that the 
amendment was about to fail a key vote, but the presiding officer in Congress 
(an Uribe ally), after trying to keep voting open for an extraordinary length of 
time, closed the legislative session on grounds that there was a disturbance on 
the house floor and refused to certify that a vote had been held.128 After a one-
day delay, the Congress held a new vote without any additional deliberation, 
and fourteen legislators changed their votes.129 The obvious inference was that 
the President intervened in the congressional deliberations and used his control 
over state patronage to secure the necessary votes. The Court held that these 
irregularities were improper because they had “distorted the popular will” and 
violated the principle that the Congress “should be” a “space of public rea-
son.”130 
At other times the Court has focused on limiting the powerful Colombian 
presidency more directly. For example, a key line of cases attempts to rein in 
the unilateral presidential use of emergency powers, requiring that most initia-
tives be undertaken through the ordinary lawmaking process.131 In particular, 
the Court has held that “chronic,” long-term problems may not be dealt with 
through emergency mechanisms, which instead are limited to truly unforeseen 
events like earthquakes and other natural disasters.132 As a result, most im-
portant policy problems can no longer be dealt with by the President unilateral-
ly, a striking change from only a few decades earlier when the country was 
nearly always under some kind of state of emergency.133 
The Court has also stepped in to mediate the relationship between Presi-
dent and voters. In another key case during President Uribe’s term, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
es/descarga/articulo/3405301.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/RV2R-3FJ3 (analyzing C-816/04 and 
its context in detail). 
 128 See Sentencia C-816/04, §§ VI.32–.34. 
 129 See id. at § VI.61. 
 130 Id. at §§ VI.109, .138. 
 131 For an overview of the relevant case law, see Uprimny, supra note 113, at 53–60. For a com-
parison of constitutional theory on presidential emergency powers in the United States, see generally 
Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1551 
(2011). 
 132 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16, 2010, Sentencia C-
252/10, §§ IV.2.3.3, VI.5.a, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-252-
10.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/R3PE-79W6 (striking down an attempt to declare a state of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Ecological emergency to deal with long-running fiscal and administrative issues in 
the healthcare sector, because “a jurisprudential tradition . . . has considered the employment of states 
of exception improper in order to improve chronic or structural problems”) (author’s translation). 
 133 In particular, the country spent 82.1% of the time under some sort of state of emergency or 
state of siege between 1970 and 1991, but only 17.5% of the time under such a state between 1991 
and 2002. See Uprimny, supra note 113, at 65 tbl.3. 
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struck down a series of referendum questions involving a package of constitu-
tional reforms on the grounds that the questions were misleading and/or pre-
sented in a way that they were likely to deceive voters. For example, the ques-
tions included introductory notes that explained a given measure to criminalize 
drug possession as designed “to protect Colombian society, particularly its in-
fants and young people.”134 Further, the Court held that voters could not be 
allowed to vote on all question as a block because that would turn the referen-
dum into a “plebiscite” on the President rather than a consideration of a diverse 
set of questions.135 The Court thus struck down parts of the proposed referen-
dum while allowing other pieces to go to the voters.136 
Finally, the Court at times has sought to prop up other control institutions 
in order to make them more effective at their tasks of checking the executive. 
In comparative terms, this seems to be a common and important—but over-
looked—function of judicial review: courts can improve the position of their 
allied institutions rather than working directly against institutions that pose a 
threat to democracy.137 The Colombian Court, for example, has drafted institu-
tions like the National Ombudsman and Attorney General’s Office into its 
large-scale structural cases involving internally displaced persons, making 
these institutions both monitors of the executive bureaucracy and sources of 
information about future policy ideas.138 These kinds of measures help to give 
institutions (other than the Court itself) leverage over the bureaucracy, argua-
bly increasing accountability. 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 9, 2003, Sentencia C-551/03, 
§ VI.139, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2003/c-551-03.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y3XW-XKG7 (author’s translation). Similarly, a question on pension reform was 
introduced by asking whether voters would approve “a measure designed to reduce social inequalities 
and control public spending.” See id. at § VI.138 (author’s translation). 
 135 See id. §§ VI.197–.198. 
 136 Of the fifteen questions allowed to go to voters, only one was approved by the requisite num-
ber of voters. See Colombia: confirmada derrota en referendo, BBCMUNDO.COM (Jan. 3, 2004, 5:51 
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/specials/2003/balance_2003/newsid_3364000/3364751.stm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/D3AY-WJ2C. 
 137 See infra notes 147–150 and accompanying text (showing the same strategy in South Africa); 
see also Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade the Constitution: The Case of the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court’s Decision on the Judicial Retirement Age, EUTOPIA LAW (Aug. 8, 2012), http://
eutopialaw.com/2012/08/08/how-to-evade-the-constitution-the-case-of-the-hungarian-constitutional-
courts-decision-on-the-judicial-retirement-age/, archived at http://perma.cc/RUR2-EM9Y (describing 
a Hungarian Constitutional Court decision attempting to defend the independence of the ordinary 
judiciary). 
 138 See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], enero, 22, 2004, Sentencia T-
025/04, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2004/t-025-04.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7U7G-XC7A (Colom.) (requiring that the authorities submit monthly reports to the 
national Ombudsman and national Attorney General in compliance with a structural decision involv-
ing internally displaced persons). 
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2. South Africa and the Problem of Dominant Parties 
As many commentators have noted, courts working in a dominant-party 
system like the one in South Africa face particular challenges. The African Na-
tional Congress (ANC), as the party that led the country’s transition out of 
apartheid, holds a firm grip on political institutions.139 It is not a monolithic 
entity, but it is a powerful force that is in no danger of losing national elec-
tions.140 These dominant-party systems pose special risks to democratization. 
The absence of political competition may weaken the quality of political insti-
tutions, and groups who do not form part of the dominant coalition may find 
themselves permanently frozen out of power.141 
The South African Court is a constrained actor—the very existence of a 
dominant party at the center of South African politics puts strict limits on what 
the Court can do.142 For example, the Court’s weak jurisprudence concerning 
the political rights of opposition members stands as an exception to the Court’s 
broader independence from the dominant ANC.143 
Still, besides core issues of political rights, the Court has aimed to im-
prove the quality of democratic institutions by working on some of the charac-
teristic problems with dominant-party systems. At times, the Court has been 
able to exploit intra-party splits within the ANC, helping to strengthen the 
voice of groups that might otherwise have been marginalized.144 The famous 
2002 socioeconomic rights case Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Cam-
paign might be explicable on these terms: after a faction of the ANC (including 
the incumbent President) came out against the availability of drugs that had 
complete effectiveness at preventing the spread of HIV in pregnant women 
from parent to child, the South African Constitutional Court handed down a 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See, e.g., Hermann Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities 
in South Africa, 8 DEMOCRATIZATION, no. 1, 2001, at 161 (describing the South African system as a 
dominant party system). 
 140 See id. at 172–73 (noting that the ANC is a factionalized party with important intra-party fac-
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decision requiring that the drugs be made widely available.145 The decision 
helped to empower leftist factions within the ANC who had been marginalized 
by the President and who supported the broader availability of the drugs.146 
Second, as in the case of Colombia, the Court has at times taken actions 
to prop up other institutions that are needed to provide accountability.147 For 
example, in a pair of recent decisions, the Court imposed limits on the ANC’s 
ability to assert control over an independent institution, the National Prosecu-
tion Authority, charged with investigating cases of political corruption.148 In 
one case, the Court struck down the President’s attempt to appoint a candidate 
who had attempted to undermine an investigation into another official facing 
criminal charges; the Court held that the President had not rationally consid-
ered all relevant factors.149 In another case the Court struck down reforms that 
would have given many of the National Prosecution Authority’s powers to the 
police.150 
C. Outsider Strategies: Working Around Democratic Institutions 
In contrast to the “insider” strategies of the previous section, where courts 
seek to improve democratic institutions, is a set of “outsider” strategies where 
courts work to build up democracy by working around those institutions. In 
other words, courts sometimes work directly to build up civil society and to 
spread constitutional culture. Although these approaches have been largely 
ignored in the literature, they appear to be commonly used in new democra-
cies. 
The core aim of the “outsider” strategy is to set up alternative forums for 
democratic deliberation which bypass traditional democratic institutions.151 
This process is especially appealing in environments with poorly functioning 
democratic institutions because it requires less direct involvement with those 
institutions and does not require that courts be as tethered to the slow process 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) at para. 135, 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/15.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Z9J4-
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 146 See, e.g., ROUX, supra note 143, at 292–303 (discussing the success of the Treatment Action 
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 148 See Democratic Alliance v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2012/24.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U9NZ-
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context, see Mark S. Kende, Enforcing the South African Constitution: The Fight for Judicial Inde-
pendence and Separation of Powers, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 43–45 (2014).  
 151 See, e.g., infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (discussing the Colombian Constitution-
al Court’s attempts to resolve social and economic problems that the legislature failed to resolve). 
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of institutional reform. That is, although courts are dependent on a “support 
structure,” including civil society support and a strong constitutional culture, to 
carry out their goals, the strategies explored in this section flip that narrative, 
demonstrating how courts can take steps to influence both variables.152 This 
Section briefly draws on examples from India and Colombia to illustrate the 
point. 
Both India and Colombia have experimented with structural injunctions 
to build up civil society groups and give these groups leverage over the state. 
The Colombian Constitutional Court established continuing jurisdiction over 
cases involving internally displaced persons or internal refugees in 2004, and 
did the same in a case involving the healthcare system in 2008.153 The internal-
ly displaced persons case involved the state’s failure to develop any real public 
policy to deal with about three to four million Colombians who had to leave 
their homes and relocate to different parts of the country because of Colom-
bia’s ongoing civil violence. The Court declared a “state of unconstitutional 
conditions” and began issuing detailed follow-up orders to the state on a range 
of issues as diverse as housing, access to job training, and restitution for lost 
property.154 The healthcare case involved the Court’s attempt to fix basic struc-
tural problems in a troubled system that is used by nearly the entire population 
of the country. In particular, the Court held that there were systematic prob-
lems involved in the package of benefits received by poorer Colombians and in 
the way the system was financed.155 
The key point here is the model used by the Court. First, the Court created 
civil-society commissions charged with monitoring bureaucratic performance 
and with formulating policy ideas.156 The commission in the internally dis-
placed persons case is composed of groups representing displaced persons 
themselves, domestic and international NGOs, and other experts in law, public 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME 
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 153 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio, 31, 2008, Sentencia T-760/08, 
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policy, sociology, and related disciplines.157 Second, the Court has held regular 
public hearings, which are generally televised and widely covered by the me-
dia.158 These hearings are attended by members of the civil society commis-
sions, control institutions, members of Congress, and the state officials them-
selves, and force the members of the state to account for their progress (or lack 
thereof) in front of the commissions and institutions charged with monitoring 
them. 
Further, the Court has retained jurisdiction and relied on a model of issu-
ing repeated follow-up orders to deal with discrete parts of the two massive 
structural cases they have taken up. The Court’s orders are based on feed-
back—in other words, on an assessment of the state’s progress in achieving the 
Court’s goals. The civil society commissions and control institutions play a key 
role in monitoring state compliance and also in suggesting policy ideas and the 
design of particular orders to the Court. The system of statistical indicators that 
the Court demanded be set up as a starting point for evaluating the magnitude 
of the problem of internally displaced persons is an example of such a policy 
idea.159 The state and the civil society commission each proposed a battery of 
indicators along a range of issues like the access of the displaced to healthcare, 
food, employment opportunities, etc., and the Court largely adopted the 
measures of the commission.160 
The Indian Supreme Court at times has acted in a very similar way. In 
2001, for example, the Court declared a structural interdict involving the right 
to food in India, over which it continues to retain jurisdiction.161 The Court 
found that there were sweeping problems with respect to the access of the poor 
to food in India, and has since issued a series of wide-ranging orders in all In-
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dian states.162 These orders have required, for example, the creation of pro-
grams to give grain to poor families, allowing poor workers to act in work-for-
food programs, and to give schoolchildren access to lunch during the school 
day.163 The Court set up a Commission to monitor compliance and to make 
policy recommendations, and the Commission consults widely with civil so-
ciety groups, viewing them as a key source of policy and compliance infor-
mation.164 In particular, the Commission has worked very closely with the 
Right to Food Campaign, a network of civil society groups that helped to 
launch the litigation.165 The Campaign itself holds regular public hearings 
throughout the country in an effort to raise awareness about the problem.166 
At their best, these cases may achieve two different goals. The first is 
strengthening civil society in contexts where it has historically been weak. The 
courts provide an incentive for civil society to organize by giving them a cen-
tral message to organize around, an institutional structure through which they 
can influence policy, and a public forum in which to air their grievances. At the 
same time, they increase the leverage of civil society by forcing the state bu-
reaucracy to pay attention to their policy ideas. The second goal is spreading 
constitutional culture, again in contexts where it has historically been weak. 
Courts do this chiefly by publicizing important constitutional issues (through 
the use of public hearings and similar devices) and by demonstrating that these 
issues need to be taken seriously. 
Civil-society building and the spreading of constitutional culture are also 
achievable outside of the confines of structural cases. For example, one could 
consider the broader strategies of the Indian and Colombian courts to radically 
expand access to constitutional justice. The Indian Supreme Court deliberately 
undertook a campaign of public interest litigation and as part of that campaign 
made access to the courts extremely easy.167 For example, it relaxed standing 
rules to allow NGOs and similar groups to sue on behalf of others when issues 
involved the public interest, and accepted informal petitions—like hand-
written letters—as sufficient to start a dispute.168 
                                                                                                                           
 162 For an overview of this sprawling case and its major orders, see generally Lauren Birchfield & 
Jessica Corsi, Between Starvation and Globalization: Realizing the Right to Food in India, 31 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 691 (2010). 
 163 See id. at 700. 
 164 The Commission more closely resembles the United States “special master”—the commis-
sioners are a pair of legal experts rather than a confluence of civil society groups. See id. at 726 (ex-
plaining that the commission is staffed by two experts). 
 165 See id. at 719–26 (explaining how the campaign works to establish grassroots support, publi-
cize the issue, and to pressure different levels of the state bureaucracy). 
 166 See id. at 724. 
 167 See, e.g., Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting 
the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 497–98 (1989). 
 168 See P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 561, 570–71 (1985). 
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The Colombian Court, similarly, has relaxed standing rules for individual 
constitutional complaints and allowed recourse to the Court through very in-
formal means.169 Moreover, the Court has engineered its substantive rules in 
ways that invite claims. For example, in the first decade of the Court’s exist-
ence it shifted away from a model in which very poor citizens could access the 
Court for socioeconomic rights claims only in unusual circumstances, towards 
a model in which the Court became a workhorse for middle-class claims seek-
ing access to healthcare treatments or larger pensions.170 Such claims now 
make up half or more of the Court’s total docket.171 
These attempts to expand access to the court might again be defended in 
part as “outsider” strategies: the allowance of broad standing for groups to rep-
resent public-interest issues, for example, might be seen as an attempt to en-
courage the formation and activism of civil society groups across a range of 
issues. The broader strategy of courts making themselves a focal point for pol-
icy-making on a range of issues could be seen as a long run strategy to increase 
the importance of constitutional values in everyday life. The Colombian strate-
gy of using constitutional litigation to adjudicate mundane socioeconomic 
rights issues, for example, has made the Colombian individual complaint per-
haps the best-known instrument in the country’s legal system.172 
As with judicial interventions designed to improve the performance of po-
litical institutions, some of the interventions catalogued here could be defended 
through the traditional tools of constitutional theory. But the dynamic perspec-
tive is useful in highlighting a productive set of questions. Critics of the large-
scale structural interventions in India and Colombia commonly critique them 
as the taking on of essentially legislative tasks, or in other words as overstep-
ping proper conceptions of judicial role.173 The dynamic perspective suggests 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See, e.g., Manuel José Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, 
Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 529, 
552–54 (2004) (explaining that the Colombian individual complaint, the tutela, may be filed by in-
formal means). 
 170 See Pablo Rueda, Legal Language and Social Change During Colombia’s Economic Crisis, in 
CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 25, 32–41 
(Javier A. Couso et al. eds., 2010) (tracing the shift in meaning from the Court’s creation in 1991 to an 
economic crisis in the late 1990s). 
 171 See, e.g., DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO, LA TUTELA Y EL DERECHO A LA SALUD 2012, at 111 tbl.2 
(2013) (Colom.), available at http://gestarsalud.com/logrosycriterios/images/PDF/tuteladerechosalud
2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5JD8-SQHZ (showing that in both 2011 and 2012, healthcare 
together with other socioeconomic rights made up well more than half of all individual complaints 
filed in the country). 
 172 See César A. Rodríguez et al., Justice and Society in Colombia: A Sociological Analysis of 
Colombian Courts, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICAN AND 
LATIN EUROPE 134, 159–62 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003) (present-
ing data about the importance and ubiquitous nature of the tutela in the country’s legal culture). 
 173 See, e.g., Landau, supra note 85, at 357–58 (giving some of the critiques of the Colombian 
Court’s structural jurisprudence). 
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that the right question to be asking may be a different one: what is the long-run 
effect of a strategy that seeks to build up alternative sources of democracy out-
side of elected institutions? Do these efforts tend to strengthen or weaken 
democratic institutions over time? I take up these questions in more depth in 
Part III. 
III. FITTING PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
What is the relevance of the sociological and legal practices surveyed in 
Parts I and II for a constitutional theory of judicial role? This Part attempts to 
answer that question by arguing that the most defensible theory built off of these 
foundations is one where judges seek to improve the functioning of democratic 
institutions through time.174 This places the judicial role in new or more fragile 
democracies in an interesting place: it is not a wholly different enterprise from 
judging in established democracies, but the sense of role does have different 
points of emphasis noted in this Part. Further, judging under such a conception is 
not a free-for-all; instead, judicial action needs to be justified with reference to 
the implications and challenges of the theory. Finally, a cautionary note: the ef-
fort here is not one to build an optimal theory from the ground up, but instead to 
construct the most reasonable justification from existing practice.175 The main 
hope is that such a theory, although eliding some normative questions, will be 
useful to the actors themselves in clarifying key issues. 
A. Constitutional Theory and Democratic Dysfunction 
Some recent work has contested the relevance of “Northern” constitution-
al theory and separation of powers to judging in the “Global South.”176 Despite 
this, it is unlikely that existing works of constitutional theory are truly inappo-
site, if for no other reason than their internal diversity. There is no standard 
answer to questions of judicial role, but instead a series of different approach-
es. Similarly, theories and practices of the separation of powers have varied 
tremendously across time and across countries. To take an obvious example, 
the kind of activism that was acceptable at the height of the Warren Court’s 
powers in the United States would be unlikely to pass muster among most fed-
eral courts today. 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See infra notes 176–254 and accompanying text. 
 175 For a justification of this kind of approach to constitutional theory, see generally Garrick B. 
Pursley, Thinning Out Structural Theory (Mar. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405983, archived at http://perma.cc/9BMX-KVWS. 
 176 See David Bilchitz, Constitutionalism, the Global South, and Economic Justice, in CONSTITU-
TIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 4, at 41, 41–42. 
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A more helpful approach breaks constitutional theory down into different 
sets of challenges and responses, as this Part does here in a partial survey.177 
Most work in the United States, for example, has started from some variant of 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty, or the problem of justifying judicial inter-
ventions in the face of electoral majorities.178 A significant strain of this work 
argues that Courts are often said to lack the legitimacy and the capacity to 
make decisions that are better left to elected officials. In the traditional formu-
lation by James Bradley Thayer, a court should not substitute its own judgment 
for that of nationally-elected officials unless it clearly believes that they are not 
“reasonable.”179 Modern Thayerians are often “popular constitutionalists”, ar-
guing that the determination of constitutional meaning is properly left to the 
public or to their elected representatives, rather than to the court.180 In the 
clearest and most extreme formulation, judicial review is unjustifiable in well-
functioning democratic systems.181 
The restraint-based vein of scholarship seems to be difficult to apply to 
the problematic democracies studied in this paper. In other words, the case 
against judicial review requires the assumption of democratic institutions “in 
reasonably good working order.”182 The case for unelected judges deferring to 
democratic resolution of contested issues breaks down unless democratic insti-
tutions function at a reasonable level. Similarly, the case for deference by judi-
ciaries in order to allow constitutionalism to flourish within the political sys-
tem—what has been called political constitutionalism—depends on “a wide-
spread commitment among the nation’s citizens to constitutional values.”183 In 
systems with strong constitutional cultures, it is plausible that political actors 
will take constitutional principles seriously, because voters will otherwise pun-
ish them. But in systems without strong constitutional cultures, there is no ob-
                                                                                                                           
 177 For a recent map of many of the positions outlined here, see generally Nimer Sultany, The 
State of Progressive Constitutional Theory: The Paradox of Constitutional Democracy and the Pro-
ject of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 372 (2012). 
 178 For the classic formulation, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court declares 
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representa-
tives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing ma-
jority but against it.”). 
 179 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 151 (1893). 
 180 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 59 (calling for a “populist constitutional law” outside of the 
courts). 
 181 See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1348 (“[J]udicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a 
mode of final decision-making in a free and democratic society.”). 
 182 Id. at 1362. Waldron is clear that the assumption of well-functioning democratic institutions is 
not an assumption of perfect institutions, nor necessarily of substantively just outcomes. See id. at 
1362–63. But his case does seem to rule out substantial deviations from liberal democracy along the 
lines studied in this article. 
 183 Tushnet, supra note 3, at 2255. 
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vious basis for the assumption that political institutions will take constitutional 
values seriously. Judicial restraint might still be the best prescription in these 
democracies, but it would need to be justified in some other way. As explained 
below, the dynamic feedback effects of judicial action on the political system 
may serve as a related, alternative justification for judicial restraint.184 
Other veins of constitutional scholarship are not necessarily inapplicable. 
For example, another major argument in the United States tradition seeks to 
justify judicial review despite the counter-majoritarian difficulty, sometimes by 
claiming that it is actually pro-democratic rather than anti-democratic. The 
best-known formulation is John Hart Ely’s political process theory, which has 
spawned a massive follow-up literature elaborating on and critiquing his 
claims. Ely’s core claim is that judicial review can be justified if courts help to 
reinforce democratic representation and increase participation, primarily by 
increasing access to the political system for minority groups that are systemati-
cally excluded from it.185 Ely, of course, envisioned his theory as a justification 
for the decisions of the Warren Court in the United States and their impact on 
African-Americans, primarily with a view towards civil-rights era jurispru-
dence. But his theory has broader resonance in comparative constitutional law 
as a possible justification for judicial action.186 
Finally, recent scholarship within the United States has revived an old 
tradition by arguing that judicial action is normally majoritarian, not counter-
majoritarian, and thus that the central challenge is actually justifying majoritar-
ian exercises of judicial review.187 Political scientists have used empirical evi-
dence to challenge the view that United States judicial review is in fact coun-
ter-majoritarian: they find instead that the Court has tended to support majori-
tarian views over the long haul.188 Recent normative work proposes that the 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See infra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
 185 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73–74 
(1980) (arguing that the Warren Court was motivated by two broad goals: “clearing the channels of 
political change” and “correcting certain kinds of discrimination against minorities”). 
 186 See, e.g., ROUX, supra note 143, at 334–35 (applying Ely’s theories to South Africa, although 
finding that because of the dominant-party context, the Court was largely incapable of fulfilling the 
goals of representation-reinforcement). 
 187 See Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Consti-
tutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 361 (2008) (arguing that recent work in political 
science has tended to underplay anti-democratic concerns with courts and find increasing concern 
with the behavior of electoral institutions); see also Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial 
Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 535–36 (2012) (arguing that the rise of “right answer” theo-
ries like originalism have weakened Thayerian impulses in the judiciary). 
 188 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The 
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 336–40 (1998) (challenging the view that judi-
cial decisions are in fact counter-majoritarian and arguing that the “counter-majoritarian” difficulty as 
an object of study has waxed and waned in importance through United States constitutional history). 
But see Amanda Frost, Defending the Majoritarian Court, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 757, 759 (accept-
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best way to justify a majoritarian Supreme Court might be that the Court helps 
to resolve a principle-agent problem, alerting and helping to coordinate re-
sistance if the “agent” (political institutions) carry out tyrannical acts against 
the principle (the “people”).189 Efforts by courts to fix fundamental deficien-
cies in political systems—the kinds of deficiencies that may prevent political 
institutions from representing even majoritarian groups—could be presented in 
a similar light. Indeed, courts in places like Hungary and Colombia have at 
times been defended as representing majoritarian political forces better than 
political institutions.190 
With these considerations in mind, one can consider three possible claims 
justifying the descriptive practices laid out in the first two Parts of this article. 
First, some strains of practice and scholarship suggest an “institutional re-
placement” theory, where courts take the failure of existing democratic institu-
tions as a mandate to replace those institutions and carry out some or all of 
their tasks. There are strains of such an approach, for example, in Indian, Co-
lombian, and Hungarian constitutional practice.191 Courts, for example, may 
seek links directly with the populace if they feel that legislatures are not play-
ing this role, or they might seek to make policy directly if they feel that other 
institutions are not willing or capable of doing so. Judicial action under this 
conception would be permissible when the court steps in and carries out activi-
ty that the political branches themselves either cannot do or cannot do well. 
The normative justification for a replacement theory could be based on the 
supposed inapplicability of restraint-based theories. 
The replacement approach is unattractive because of its failure to heed in-
stitutional and dynamic considerations. First, it invites judges to overstate the 
differences between newer democracies and more mature democracies. Virtu-
ally all democratic systems may have serious problems in their quality of rep-
resentation, and the differences between systems are better referred to as dif-
ferences in degree rather than in kind. Further, judiciaries lack the capacity to 
replace most of the core functions of well-functioning legislative or bureau-
                                                                                                                           
ing Friedman’s core thesis but arguing that differences in method of appointment between the federal 
and state judiciary still affect judicial behavior in important ways). 
 189 See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 725, 
730 (2009) (arguing that judicial review can be justified without necessarily assuming an “antagonis-
tic” relationship between the courts and the people). 
 190 See, e.g., Landau, supra note 85, at 355–58 (noting how the Colombian Constitutional Court 
effectively managed a bailout of middle-class homeowners and justified its intervention on the 
grounds that the Court was closer to the people than political institutions); Kim Lane Scheppele, A 
Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1941–49 (2004) (arguing that due to rep-
resentation problems in Hungary after the democratic transition and pressure from international organ-
izations, courts actually did a better job of representing public will). 
 191 See Landau, supra note 85, at 345–47 (noting some of the same tendencies on the Colombian 
Constitutional Court); Robinson, supra note 73, at 16–17 (quoting the statements of Chief Justice 
Balakrishnan, who implied that extreme judicial activism was justified by poor political performance). 
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cratic officials. The functional lines between courts and other political actors 
are malleable, but they do exist.192 In other words, the fact that political institu-
tions are widely perceived as incapable of carrying out certain tasks does not 
automatically render courts the proper forum for doing so. Institutional failure 
creates a vacuum, but not necessarily one that courts can legitimately fill. 
Finally, the replacement theory is heedless of the dynamic effects of judi-
cial intervention: it would appear to abandon problematic democracies to a 
permanent state of dysfunction, and it would view that permanent dysfunction 
as a durable mandate for extraordinary judicial intervention. This view is eerily 
similar to one long promoted in Latin America, where the supposed absence of 
democratic values or well-functioning political systems was taken to allow 
strong presidencies to rule via emergency powers or states of siege.193 The use 
of these emergency powers in turn may have helped to perpetuate abnormality 
by weakening the development of legislative institutions and constitutional 
values.194 
A second possible focus for a theory of judicial role would be the process 
of constitutional transformation itself. It has become commonplace to note that 
constitutions in new democracies are often “transformative” rather than “pre-
servative.”195 Transformative constitutionalism seeks to remake a country’s 
(supposedly deficient) political and social institutions by moving them closer 
to the sets of principles, values, and practices found in the constitutional text. 
One might argue that judges in poorly-functioning political systems should 
focus on realizing the constitutional project. Under such a conception, judicial 
action would be permissible if it helped to move politics and society closer to 
                                                                                                                           
 192 In the socioeconomic rights context, for example, few scholars deny that there are real differ-
ences in judicial versus legislative or executive capacity to make complex policy choices. See, e.g., 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 223–24 (noting that socioeconomic rights raise special problems of capaci-
ty and democratic legitimacy for courts); TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 227–34 (same). 
 193 See, e.g., Jorge González-Jacome, Emergency Powers and the Feeling of Backwardness in 
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U. L. REV. 735, 743 (2011). 
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the constitutional ideal and impermissible if it either moved politics and socie-
ty further away from the constitutional ideal or was unrelated to that goal. 
A constitutional transformation approach and the democracy-improving 
approach studied in this article share a dynamic focus. But a constitutional 
transformation theory is problematic because it again elides institutional con-
siderations: it ignores the question of which institution is tasked with the pro-
cess of constitutional transformation, or rather answers that question by assum-
ing that the process of constitutional transformation should be judge-led. Con-
stitutional mandates are contestable; they are open to interpretation. As Wal-
dron argues, it is often more reasonable to have democratic processes rather 
than courts make determinations about constitutional meaning.196 This objec-
tion need not fatally undermine all variants of a constitutional transformation 
theory. It may be that courts are on solid ground in trying to realize important 
constitutional mandates in cases where the political branches wholly ignore 
those mandates. But it does suggest that the task of constitutional transfor-
mation should be viewed as a second-best to the task of improving political 
institutions themselves. And because modern constitutions tend to be so thick, 
a full embrace of a constitutional transformation model would threaten to col-
lapse into the replacement model rejected above. 
This leaves a third possibility: courts in new democracies should devote 
some part of their energy to improving the performance of democratic institu-
tions through time. In other words, courts should play at least a modest role in 
making abnormal institutions function more normally. This simple formula-
tion, of course, hides a potentially rich agenda and a variety of different tasks. 
Courts might, for example, aim to make democratic institutions more robust by 
protecting them from democratic erosion,197 or they might aim to correct some 
of the defects inherent in non-institutionalized or dominant-party systems.198 
Courts might also attempt to build up civil society where it has historically 
been weak, or to construct constitutional cultures in citizens where they do not 
initially exist.199 Both approaches were surveyed in some depth above.200 
A dynamic theory makes sense of the recent trends in constitutional de-
sign, judicial behavior, and scholarship surveyed in Parts I and II.201 Both 
courts and other institutions in new democracies do make efforts to protect 
democratic orders, to correct for weaknesses in party systems, and to build civ-
il society and constitutional culture. Further, recent scholarly work has empha-
sized the dynamic effect that courts might have in new democracies. Recent 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See Waldron, supra note 2, at 1366–69, 1406. 
 197 See supra notes 94–107 and accompanying text. 
 198 See supra notes 110–150 and accompanying text. 
 199 See supra notes 152–173 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra notes 152–173 and accompanying text. 
 201 See supra notes 13–173 and accompanying text. 
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work on Turkey, India, and South Africa, emphasizes the role that courts can 
play both in protecting democracies from erosion and in improving the per-
formance of dominant-party systems.202 Another scholar, in a comprehensive 
book on the enforcement of socioeconomic rights in the developing world, ar-
gues that courts should aim to play a “catalytic role,” in particular focusing on 
empowering civil society groups in contexts where they have historically been 
weak.203 
Such a theory of judicial role is related to both the political process and 
majoritarian strands of constitutional theory. It obviously resembles political 
process theory in that the justification for review is the improvement of the 
political system. Highly interventionist decisions in the United States—like 
structural cases involving school desegregation and prison conditions—were 
justified in large part in terms of the protection of “discrete and insular” minor-
ities.204 The difference in the contexts studied here is thus in degree and not in 
kind. Most importantly, the failures in weak-party and to some extent also 
dominant-party systems are not just ones which afflict discrete minority 
groups, but also majorities. This may make the task more feasible—by opening 
a pathway by which courts can act aggressively and yet popularly—but also 
more sweeping. 
Finally, a dynamic theory is flexible, consistent with a range of specific 
judicial tasks.205 Its main value is in suggesting a somewhat different set of 
questions for evaluating exercises of judicial power. Take, for example, a struc-
tural injunction case involving the right to food, like the massive and ongoing 
case in India.206 Constitutional theory tends to ask a stock set of questions 
about these interventions. For example, a key question would generally be 
whether the intervention is justified by extraordinary circumstances, such as if 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts, supra note 1, at 993–99 (finding some success for the 
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 203 See Katharine G. Young, A Typology of Economic and Social Rights Adjudication: Exploring 
the Catalytic Function of Judicial Review, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 385, 412 (2010) (proposing that courts 
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 206 See supra notes 160–166 and accompanying text. 
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it benefitted a minority group wholly excluded from the political process.207 
But such a question may make little sense in a poorly-functioning political sys-
tem, where the popular assumption is that the government serves most groups 
badly, including middle-class groups that would normally be expected to have 
a voice. Constitutional theorists would also ask whether the court is extra-
limiting by taking on essentially legislative tasks, reaching beyond its capacity 
and legitimacy.208 But this assumption of fixed differences between legislative 
and judicial roles again may make little sense to judges and citizens in many 
new democracies, because it suggests that courts should defer to institutions 
that are themselves functioning poorly. 
A dynamic perspective would instead focus on a set of questions that may 
prove more useful, or at least that might supplement those found in conven-
tional theory. Aggressive interventions like those involved in the Indian case 
might be justifiable if they help to build up the strength of civil society, the 
density of constitutional culture, and the capacity of the bureaucracy. On the 
other hand, they would be harder to justify if they tended to slow or reverse 
improvements in the quality of political institutions through time, perhaps by 
diverting citizens’ attention and resources away from representative institutions 
and towards courts. The point is not that anything is justifiable from a dynamic 
perspective, but that the reasons why a given intervention might or might not 
make sense are somewhat different from those found in conventional constitu-
tional theory. 
B. The Challenges Posed by a Dynamic Perspective 
The value of a dynamic perspective on judicial role, in other words, is in 
posing at least two kinds of important questions: (1) questions of plausibility, 
or whether it is politically feasible for judges to play a role in improving politi-
cal institutions through time;209 and (2) questions of democratic impact, or 
whether a given intervention might have a net-negative impact either by un-
dervaluing the democracy of the present or by warping the path of democratic 
development for the future.210 Both points have rich implications for the strat-
egies that judges should utilize under a dynamic approach. 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text (discussing political process theory); infra 
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1. The Challenge of Plausibility 
The South African example suggests a first challenge for a dynamic theo-
ry of judicial role that focuses on courts improving political institutions: it may 
be implausible because it requires courts to take actions that go against the 
core political interests of their own regimes. All normative theories of role are, 
of course, subject to pragmatic constraints, but a normative theory is of little 
use if it is nearly impossible for judges to carry out. 
Yet in dominant-party systems, particular strategies may indeed be very 
difficult for courts to pull off precisely because of the constraints imposed by 
the dominant party. The South African Constitutional Court has been particu-
larly timid when confronted with cases involving the political rights of opposi-
tion parties and actors.211 This has arguably been the Court’s biggest disap-
pointment.212 Although the Court has a relatively high amount of freedom to 
enforce rights in cases involving the death penalty or socioeconomic rights, it 
is very constrained when trying to directly open up the political regime be-
cause those cases involve core interests of the ANC. A Court overly aggressive 
on those questions would risk retaliation.213 More broadly, there is some com-
parative evidence that a court operating in most political systems with strong 
parties will often have difficulty working against the core interests of those 
parties.214 This is both because the justices themselves are typically products of 
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by Thailand’s constitutional court, which was viewed as taking a side in a political dispute and may 
thus have inflamed rather than calmed tensions). 
 214 Mexico offers a stark example. The Supreme Court of Mexico historically served as a subser-
vient body within what was essentially a one-party dictatorship led by the Institutional Revolution 
Party (“PRI”), but as the country democratized in the 1990s, the Court was reformed to act as an arbi-
trator within an emerging three-party system. At least one of the newly empowered opposition parties, 
the National Action Party (“PAN”), sought institutions that would ensure electoral fairness and guard 
the separation of powers within a (long-dormant) federal system. See, e.g., JODI S. FINKEL, JUDICIAL 
REFORM AS POLITICAL INSURANCE: ARGENTINA, PERU, AND MEXICO IN THE 1990S, at 89–110 
(2008) (noting that judicial reform was supported by the PAN but opposed by the Party of the Demo-
cratic Revolution). The Court was designed for those purposes: the reforms to the Court created a new 
mechanism allowing for minorities in national and state-level legislatures, as well as political parties, 
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Court to determine conflicts between different branches or level of governments. The resulting Su-
preme Court has in many ways been an agent of the interests of these parties. It has, for example, 
issued important decisions to strengthen federalism and the separation of powers, while doing rela-
tively little to enforce the rights provisions of the Constitution. See Miguel Schor, An Essay on the 
Emergence of Constitutional Courts: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL L. 
STUD. 173, 177–83 (2009). Further, it has, at times, acted against those left out of the party frame-
work. In a 2005 decision, for example, the Court denied an independent candidate even the standing to 
challenge a law restricting him from running for political office. Ironically, it held that such standing 
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those parties and because attempts to work against the core interests of strong 
parties are particularly likely to provoke retaliation against a court. The legal 
status of third parties within United States constitutional and electoral law 
might be a case in point.215 In systems with strong parties, in other words, we 
would expect the judiciary in some sense to act as an agent for the parties, and 
that may make them rather unlikely to act in a counter-system manner. 
A related but subtler problem may arise in systems where political parties 
are very weak (see Colombia), or otherwise held in low regard (see India). 
Here the problem is that courts have incentives to gain political capital by at-
tacking political institutions, rather than by building them up. Where political 
institutions are weak or perceived as corrupt, justices may be able to gain polit-
ical support by adopting a discourse and perhaps a jurisprudence that treats 
them with contempt. The Colombian Court, for example, intervenes aggres-
sively in legislative procedure because it lacks respect for the Congress, and 
sometimes replaces the political branches in making public policy for the same 
reason.216 In one interesting example, the Court stepped in to fix a housing cri-
sis by making a series of policy decisions; the justice who authored the key 
decisions defended them by quoting a historical populist politician who had 
stated that “the people are much more intelligent . . . than their leaders.”217 As 
explained in more detail below, the long-run effects of these sorts of interven-
tions on the quality of political institutions are unclear.218 But there is reason to 
suspect that some of these actions will have negative rather than positive dy-
namic effects on political institutions. 
                                                                                                                           
was limited to political parties. See Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], 
Amparo en Revisión 743/2005, available at http://www.poderjudicialags.gob.mx/Conferencias%20
Transparencia/pdfs%5CMATERIAL%20DE%20CONFERENCIAS%20SOBRE%20TRANSPAREN
CIA%20IMPARTIDAS%20POR%20LA%20SCJN%5CEJECUTORIAS/743-2005%20AR%20PL%
20VP.doc, archived at http://perma.cc/PKP6-YJUH. The laws prohibiting independent candidates 
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Convention on Human Rights. See Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 251 (Aug, 6, 2008), available at http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_184_ing.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U4UX-
CPUN (holding that the existing legal framework violated the right to judicial protection embodied in 
Article 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights). 
 215 Scholars have pointed out that courts in the United States tend to support the entrenched two-
party system rather than favoring outsiders or upstarts. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. 
Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 670–
74, 681–90 (1998) (arguing that courts often uphold regulations that are in fact designed to entrench 
two-party dominance). 
 216 See supra notes 119–124 and accompanying text (giving examples of relevant caselaw). 
 217 See Landau, supra note 160, at 219. The case involved a series of Constitutional Court deci-
sions during a housing crisis that threatened several hundred thousand debtors with foreclosure, and in 
which the Court perceived that the political branches were not taking action. See id. at at 216–19. 
 218 See infra notes 235–254 and accompanying text. 
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The broad point here is that courts are products of their political regimes. 
This often makes them more likely to act in a pro-system rather than counter-
system manner: in the worst case they may actually tend to exacerbate defects 
in their political systems rather than helping to correct them. This ought to 
temper our optimism for a dynamic theory of judicial role, but it is not a damn-
ing critique of the theory. The same weakness afflicts most constitutional theo-
ry. For example, studies of American constitutional history have convincingly 
shown that the United States Supreme Court normally acts as a majoritarian 
rather than counter-majoritarian institution, or at least rarely strays from the 
political mainstream for long.219 This fact acts as a dose of realism for a num-
ber of theories—like political-process theory—that rely on courts taking un-
popular decisions.220 But it does not fatally undermine those theories, because 
the Supreme Court has often been able to take a number of different decisions 
while still staying within the political mainstream. 
The same point might be made in comparative terms: the shape of a party 
system places restrictions on a court operating within that system—and thus 
should make our claims about judicial role more modest in scope—but this 
does not mean that courts are powerless in correcting the defects found within 
their political regimes. Even in dominant-party systems, courts can take a 
range of actions without outrunning their “zone of tolerance.”221 And in other 
political systems, particularly non-institutionalized party systems, courts have 
more freedom of action. These party systems may shape the incentives of 
courts by giving them a strategy of gaining popularity by undermining the par-
ty system, but they do not really limit their freedom of action. Indeed, in in-
choate party systems, it may actually be more feasible for courts to play a “po-
litical process” role than it is in the United States, precisely because courts can 
gain majoritarian popularity through efforts to fix their party systems. 
The constraints political systems place on judicial power may, however, 
be useful in thinking through ways in which courts might be most effective in 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLU-
ENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367–68 (2009) 
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Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 284 (2010) (noting that “American courts have not, 
over the long run, acted as strongly counter-majoritarian bodies” and exploring the problems this fact 
poses for American constitutional theory). 
 220 See Dorf, supra note 219, at 290 (noting the ways in which Friedman’s majoritarian image of 
the Supreme Court erodes the evidence for Ely’s process-based theory). 
 221 See Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Mainte-
nance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 127–29 (2002) (developing 
a theory of when courts face retaliation and applying that theory to the Russian Constitutional Court). 
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their task. In particular, they may suggest the superiority of “outsider” strate-
gies over “insider” strategies. The South African case again offers an interest-
ing example. The South African Constitutional Court is highly restricted in the 
extent to which it can directly increase the power of opposition parties and fig-
ures, because cases involving those actors raise core interests of the ANC. 
Other insider strategies, like propping up the independence of control institu-
tions or using sub-constitutional decisions to aid opposition actors under the 
radar, may be less constrained.222 But the South African Court has focused less 
on outsider strategies, where it may face fewer constraints. The Court is not 
well-known or particularly popular with the public, and has often not made 
much effort to engage civil society. This suggests an untapped potential strate-
gy choice, a point I return to below.223 
In non-institutionalized party systems, outsider strategies may be better 
than insider strategies for a different reason: the strategy of “building up” a 
weak party system may be largely impossible for a court to carry out. The var-
ious efforts of the Colombian Constitutional Court and other institutions to 
cleanse the Colombian Congress or to make it a more deliberative body all 
suggest that there are limits on a court’s ability to organize a disorganized par-
ty system. In those circumstances as well, it may be that outsider strategies 
have more of a chance to work effectively. But the broadest point is that we 
still know very little about the empirical effects of different strategies through 
time—this is an area where more empirical research is badly needed. 
2. The Challenge of Democratic Impact 
The dynamic theories that have been developed in comparative constitu-
tional law and practice are necessarily based on a vision that existing political 
institutions are fundamentally flawed. This vision permits extraordinary inter-
ventions in current forms of democracy in the name of constructing a better 
one. But this conception of the theory raises two significant challenges in its 
relationship to democracy. First, dynamic theories of judicial role appear to be 
in constant danger of undervaluing the admittedly flawed democracies of the 
present.224 Second, judicial interventions may hinder rather than aid improve-
ment in democratic institutions through time.225 Both of these possibilities also 
highlight the sheer vagueness of a dynamic approach in guiding judicial action: 
it is very difficult for a judge to know whether a given strategy is justified. 
First, judicial actors in newer or more fragile democracies and their de-
fenders sometimes act as though their political systems operate on wholly dif-
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 223 See infra notes 257–287 and accompanying text. 
 224 See infra notes 226–234 and accompanying text. 
 225 See infra notes 235–240 and accompanying text. 
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ferent logics than those in consolidated democracies.226 But this claim is obvi-
ously untrue—all political systems have at least pockets with serious problems 
of representation, accountability, and capacity. Take the assumption that a con-
gress or parliament be “well-functioning.”227 Many legislatures around the 
world might be argued to fail this test, the United States Congress included.228 
The decline in the salience of party systems in most countries has been well-
documented.229 Put in this context, dynamic theories of judicial review may 
prove far too much—they might justify extraordinary interventions across both 
developing and developed democracies. Indeed, as a descriptive matter, the 
disenchantment with electoral politics is part of the explanation for the increas-
ing judicialization of politics around the world.230 
The possibility of undervaluing the democracy of the present is again an 
important critique of the theory but not a damning one. There are differences—in 
degree if not in kind—between different types of democracy. The finding that 
some systems are particularly prone to democratic failure is real: newer democ-
racies face risks of erosion that are more serious than those found in more-
developed democracies.231 The problems of representativeness and accountabil-
ity posed by non-institutionalized or dominant-party systems are again real: both 
systems produce pathologies that are consistent across different countries and 
predictable in their results.232 Moreover, pervasive problems of corruption afflict 
many countries in the developing world, whereas corruption is generally a much 
less serious problem in developed democracies.233 In short, there are meaningful 
differences that justify a different approach in many new democracies.234 
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1544 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1501 
The more serious challenge to a theory that relies on the dynamic effects 
of judicial action is the disquieting possibility that judicial interventions aimed 
at improving democracy through time may actually have negative dynamic 
effects. In other words, it is possible that institutional designs and judicial deci-
sions designed to improve and normalize democratic performance may have 
the opposite impact. The problem is perhaps easiest to see with institutions 
designed to protect against democratic erosion. Some commentators, for ex-
ample, suggest institutionalizing a role for the military as a hedge against dem-
ocratic erosion in some political contexts.235 The theory is that military actors, 
if inculcated with the proper set of values, can protect democracy with re-
sources that courts do not have.236 Anti-democratic parties or actors may be 
able to ignore or pack courts, but they will have more difficulty neutralizing 
military actors.237 Others recommend giving courts a predominant role, by al-
lowing them to ban anti-democratic parties or strike down problematic consti-
tutional amendments.238 Turkish democracy, for example, historically com-
bined elements all pieces of this model. The Turkish military was seen as a 
guardian of the secular democratic order and stepped in several times to pro-
tect against the threat of chaos or the threat posed by Islamist parties.239 The 
Turkish Constitutional Court acted aggressively to ban parties and to strike 
down constitutional amendments that were seen as violating core principles of 
the constitution.240 
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build a differential assessment of the quality of legislative deliberation into its jurisprudence. The 
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The model views these elements as temporary devices to help buy time as 
the democracy matures. But it is fairly obvious that each of them also poses 
risks to democratic development, although in different ways and perhaps in 
different magnitudes. At worst case, an actor designed to protect democracy 
might play a directly anti-democratic role: the military could overthrow or in-
tervene in a democratic order to establish a military dictatorship or for a num-
ber of other bad reasons.241 More subtly, the existence of all of these crutches 
might have a negative rather than positive impact on the way that democratic 
institutions evolve. For example, it may be that if dangerous but seductive po-
litical movements are banned from the political sphere rather than being al-
lowed to compete, the remaining parties may not work as hard at developing 
popular appeal, and thus may be unprepared to compete if they someday have 
to stand for election against the full spectrum of political competition. Similar-
ly, the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments may have a neg-
ative impact on legislative behavior: legislators, knowing that the court will 
protect the system from deeply anti-democratic constitutional amendments, 
will have fewer incentives to develop internal safeguards regarding the use of 
the amendment process.242 
The evidence from Turkey, although ambiguous, may support the idea 
that these kinds of institutions can weaken democratic development through 
time. Although the Constitutional Court banned several times the large Islamic 
movement that would become the ruling Justice and Development party, it 
continued to win votes through successive elections and eventually was al-
lowed to take office.243 The party platform moderated somewhat with each new 
incarnation, but the actors and basic goals remained the same.244 Once it took 
office, it neutralized the extraordinary powers previously exercised by both the 
Court and the military. The Constitutional Court was packed by members of 
the majority party, and the military had its political role largely removed.245 
                                                                                                                           
tutional Amendment—The Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s 
Headscarf Decision, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 175, 176, 182–89 (2012) (exploring the Court’s use of the 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment power). 
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American militaries have played in “maintain[ing] internal order” rather than external peace). 
 242 See TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 57–58 (referring to this problem as “judicial overhang”). 
 243 See Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, supra note 1, at 1442–46 (tracing the history of at-
tempts to ban the movement that would become the Justice and Development party). 
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to the military is more complex: the ruling Justice and Development party has certainly taken away 
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The result is that Turkey has become a dominant-party regime, and perhaps is 
undergoing a process of democratic erosion.246 The old secular parties, mean-
while, have not fared well within the new system.247 
Teasing out causation is quite difficult. One might say that the extraordi-
nary institutions—the political role of the military and the exceptional powers 
of the Constitutional Court—were necessarily temporary, and their defanging 
was part of the process of normalizing the democracy. As noted above, a theo-
ry that allows for a permanent hemming in or replacement of democracy, or 
that maintains it in a permanent state of abnormality, seems deeply problemat-
ic.248 The only problem may have been the timing: the safeguard institutions 
were not in place long enough to have the intended effect. On the other hand, 
there does seem to be some evidence that the secular parties did not develop 
the political competitiveness or popularity needed to compete on an open play-
ing field. This may have been inevitable, or it may have been a result of the 
hemming in of democratic institutions. 
The Turkish case is an unusual one because the safeguards that were used 
in that regime placed extraordinary restrictions on democracy. But a similar 
argument might be made about other judicial efforts to build up democratic 
institutions. Take, for example, judicial efforts to work around political institu-
tions by building up alternative spaces for democratic development. As already 
noted, for example, the Indian and Colombian Constitutional Courts have is-
sued structural remedies involving food, healthcare, and other constitutional 
goods that seemed designed to make themselves the center of policymaking.249 
The dynamic effects of this strategy are unclear. It may be that they start a vir-
tuous circle: a court’s efforts to strengthen civil society and increase the sali-
ence of constitutional culture may spark new pressures that over time improve 
the quality of democratic institutions. On the other hand, such powerful judi-
cial action may in fact sap energy from political institutions. As civil society 
groups and citizens come to view the court and not the political institutions as 
their best shot at getting responses from government institutions, they may fo-
cus on the court rather than on legislatures and executives, thus hindering the 
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development of those institutions. Aggressive judicial assertions of power—
even ones designed to improve the quality of democratic politics—may have 
negative effects on the development of other political institutions.250 
The possibility again serves as an important critique and corrective on a 
dynamic theory of judicial review. It counsels for modesty in judicial exercises 
of power, because we know very little about the dynamic effects of aggressive 
exercises of judicial review in newer democracies. It is hard to say whether 
strong courts support or undermine democratic development. Second, it argues 
for more scholarly work in figuring out which kinds of tools are particularly 
likely to have negative effects on democratic development.251 Third, it high-
lights the uncertainty embedded in a dynamic theory of judicial review, be-
cause it suggests that courts and other actors may have a very difficult time 
figuring out whether a given strategy is justified. Finally, a consideration of the 
negative effects that exercises of judicial power may have on democratic de-
velopment might again be helpful in trying to design improved judicial strate-
gies. This may in part be about coming up with less damaging alternatives to 
existing practices. It may be less harmful to ban particular manifestations of 
speech within elections than to ban supposedly anti-competitive parties alto-
gether, and it may be better to prohibit parties from competing in elections ra-
ther than banning them altogether.252 
With more complex approaches like structural injunctions, there may be 
ways to build up civil society without having the court run the risk of replacing 
the political branches as the center of policymaking. The concept of democrat-
ic experimentalism or destabilization rights might be useful here—courts can 
try to help organize civil society groups, and to give those groups leverage 
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over state officials, without themselves becoming the focal point for making 
policy decisions.253 This may help to ensure that courts reap the dynamic bene-
fits of judicial activism without paying the high costs of stunting democratic 
institutions. Courts, in other words, might focus on ensuring that civil society 
groups have a voice with policymakers (through devices such as public hear-
ings) and monitoring the development of negotiated solutions, rather than with 
direct exercises of setting policy.254 The point of this Section, at any rate, is not 
to design particular remedial strategies but to suggest that the problem of judi-
cial activism warping democratic development is one that should shape strate-
gy choices by judges. The next Part takes these considerations further, by 
showing how a dynamic perspective is helpful in providing perspective on 
some of the most difficult contemporary problems in the field of comparative 
constitutional law. 
IV. THE THEORY APPLIED: TWO PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
One test of a theoretical approach is whether it is useful “in action” to 
shed light on live debates: this section demonstrates that a dynamic theory can 
provide that perspective. In particular, I apply the theory to two of the most 
important and unsettled questions in the field of comparative constitutional 
law: the debate about the forms of review or the intensity with which courts 
seek to review political action,255 and the debate about the appropriateness of a 
substantive doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments.256 In both 
cases, I show that the approach is useful in helping to frame the questions that 
judges should be asking. 
A. The Debate Between Weak-Form and Strong-Form Review 
Some of the most important recent work in the field has focused on the 
proper means for judges to exercise judicial review, particularly for newer 
rights like socioeconomic rights. The centerpiece of this literature is the fa-
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found in that decree. See id. at 1021. 
 254 For more detail on this model of judicial involvement, see infra notes 271–287 and accompa-
nying text. 
 255 See infra notes 257–287 and accompanying text. 
 256 See infra notes 288–325 and accompanying text. 
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mous 2001 case Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, in 
which the South African Constitutional Court ruled that Parliament had a duty 
to provide a solution to the lack of available housing for the poor.257 A large 
group of commentators has lauded Grootboom as inventing a new form of re-
view and as representing a “canonical” case within the field.258  
In Grootboom, the South African Constitutional Court considered a chal-
lenge to South African housing policy by an impoverished woman who had 
been evicted from her existing housing and who had no other access to hous-
ing.259 She claimed that South Africa’s housing policies, and particularly its 
failure to provide short-term solutions for people like her who were in desper-
ate need, violated the constitutional right to housing.260 The South African 
Constitutional Court agreed with the plaintiff, but refused to issue either an 
individualized remedy or a structural remedy covering all plaintiffs in her situ-
ation. Instead, the Court merely issued a declaration that the state was not ful-
filling the constitutional rights at issue because it had no plan for people with 
the gravest short-term needs, and asked the Parliament and other authorities to 
fix that deficiency.261 
This approach to rights-enforcement has been dubbed “weak-form” en-
forcement. Weak-form enforcement is a model of review where the court 
points out violations of rights to the political branches and to the citizenry, but 
then steps back rather than seeking to make policy on the right at issue.262 Leg-
islative actors can then “address—or deliberatively refuse to address—the dif-
ficulties the courts have identified.”263 This is contrasted to standard “strong-
form” review, where the Court itself makes the relevant policy determination. 
Scholars have praised the Grootboom decision, and more broadly weak-
form review, as properly reconciling the enforcement of rights—particularly 
                                                                                                                           
 257 See Gov’t of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para. 99, available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/19.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DE4K-HVP4. 
 258 See, e.g., ROUX, supra note 143 at 280 (“Grootboom is to South African constitutional lawyers 
what Brown v. Board of Education is to their American counterparts.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 
229 (noting the decision’s “distinctive and novel” approach); TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 242 (calling 
the case “celebrated”); Heinz Klug, Grootboom at Home and Abroad: Adventures in the Construction 
of a Global Constitutional Canon 1 (Feb. 24, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149&context=schmooze_papers, 
archived at http://perma.cc/J37G-5MBR (describing the decision as “canonical”). 
 259 See Grootboom, (1) SA 46 at paras. 3–4. 
 260 See id. at para. 13. 
 261 See id. at para. 99 (issuing a declaratory order announcing, inter alia, that “Section 26(2) of 
the Constitution requires the state to devise and implement within its available resources a compre-
hensive and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access to adequate housing”). 
 262 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and “Core” Civil Liberties, 41 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (defining weak-form review as a style of review where “judges’ rulings 
on constitutional questions are expressly open to legislative revision in the short run”). 
 263 Tushnet, supra note 3, at 2249. 
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socioeconomic rights—with democracy.264 They point out that socioeconomic 
rights like the right to food, housing, and healthcare raise special concerns of 
democratic legitimacy and capacity because they may require that judges re-
work state priorities and make decisions involving large amounts of budgetary 
resources.265 Although many non-socioeconomic rights cost money (take the 
right to a fair trial), there are real differences in degree, if not in kind, between 
so-called first generation rights and socioeconomic rights.266 
Supporters of weak-form review thus view it as a way to reconcile espe-
cially troublesome kinds of rights with democracy. Courts can act to vindicate 
the right while being especially careful to avoid invading the proper space of 
political actors. In other words, these scholars see weak-form review as the 
solution to judicial overreaching within a standard, static conception of demo-
cratic theory. Given this theoretical construct, weak-form review is arguably 
“the only decent institutional design for the enforcement of social and econom-
ic rights,” and perhaps for the enforcement of a much broader set of rights as 
well.267 
Although the Grootboom decision has largely been celebrated by foreign 
constitutional theorists who view it as the solution to their own difficult prob-
lems of constitutional theory, it has received a very different reception in South 
Africa, where it is commonly (although not universally) viewed as a disap-
pointment.268 The case against Grootboom is that the Court’s remedy—an ex-
hortation to the political branches to take unspecified forms of action—was too 
weak to achieve anything.269 Similarly, the “model” of review invented by 
                                                                                                                           
 264 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 235 (praising the decision for “promoting a certain kind of 
deliberation, not by preempting it, as a result of directing political attention to interests that would 
otherwise be disregarded in ordinary political life”); TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 244 (noting that the 
order in Grootboom had “some judicially enforceable content” but “was quite limited in its effects”). 
 265 See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 231–33. Tushnet quotes Frank Cross’s well-known argument 
against judicial enforcement of social rights in the United States because such “enforcement [either] 
raises the spectre of ‘the courts running everything . . . .” or the much more likely view that courts will 
do nothing with those rights because they view them as too politically-costly to enforce. See id. at 
231; see also Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 887 (2001) 
(“[B]oth the critics and the proponents often misconceive the likely consequences of positive rights 
recognition, namely that positive rights would not be aggressively enforced.”). 
 266 See TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 234 (noting that first-generation rights like the right to free 
speech imply costs but arguing that “the size of budgetary consequences matters”). 
 267 See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 2259. 
 268 See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Giving Socioeconomic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its 
Importance, 119 S. AFR. L.J. 484, 484 (2002) (criticizing Grootboom as having an “undesirable ef-
fect” on enforcement of the social right at issue); Rosalind Dixon, Creating Dialogue About Socioec-
onomic Rights: Strong-Form v. Weak-Form Judicial Review Revisited, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 391, 392 
(2007) (noting that South African “[c]onstitutional scholars now agree generally that the Court’s in-
tervention was—to an important degree—too limited or ‘weak’”). 
 269 See, e.g., Dennis Davis, Socio-economic Rights in South Africa: The Record of the Constitu-
tional Court After Ten Years, ESR REV., Dec. 2004, at 3, 5 (arguing that, in response to Grootboom, 
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Grootboom has not spread to the rest of the developing world. Others courts 
active in enforcing socioeconomic rights in Latin America and Asia have relied 
on a different set of approaches, including giving individual plaintiffs specific 
individual remedies and using structural injunctions.270 
Within South Africa itself, however, Grootboom has important progeny: a 
series of follow-up cases also on the right to housing, and in which the South 
African Constitutional Court has tried to make weak-form review more effec-
tive. Most of these cases involved poor citizens at risk of being evicted from 
their homes, and without any other place to live.271 The Court began issuing 
what it called “engagement” remedies, where it required officials to negotiate 
with private actors or with their civil society representatives before carrying 
out the eviction.272 This allowed the Court to resolve the case without getting 
into a deep discussion of the underlying constitutional law issues, and without 
directly making policy. Sometimes, these engagements resulted in successful 
outcomes and serious discussions; often, they did not.273 
In recent cases, the Court has tried to put more teeth into the engagement 
remedy by requiring that the state follow particular procedures in the course of 
the engagement. For example, the Court has required that the state consider 
certain issues—say the presence of adequate alternative housing—before car-
rying out an eviction.274 Further, in recent decisions, the Court has shown a 
tendency to avoid constitutional issues if it can: it has treated arguably consti-
tutional issues as statutory ones. In particular, it has shoe-horned many of the 
recent housing cases into the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
                                                                                                                           
“there has been little visible change in housing policy to cater for people who find themselves in des-
perate and crises situations”). 
 270 See Landau, supra note 160, at 199 (finding that the South African approach has “not been 
used anywhere else”). 
 271 For a comprehensive overview of post-Grootboom housing jurisprudence up to the present, 
see generally Brian Ray, Evictions, Avoidance, and the Aspirational Impulse, CONST. CT. REV. (forth-
coming 2014) (S. Afr.). 
 272 See, e.g., Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v. City of Johannesburg, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) paras. 9–
11, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2008/1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DF6A-
ARLX (describing the process of engagement ordered by the Court in a prior decision). 
 273 See Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanisms to Develop Con-
stitutional Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 797, 837–42 (describing the 
failure of an engagement order in a case, Mamba v. Minister of Soc. Dev., 2008 Case No. CCT 65/08 
(CC) (S. Afr.), involving refugee camps that were scheduled to be shut down). 
 274 See Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355 JR v. Golden Thread, 2012 (2) SA 
337 (CC) at para. 21, available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2011/35.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UVG-6LNK (issuing an order requiring a detailed report from the local government 
covering, inter alia, (1) “the particulars of the housing situation of the applicants,” (2) “the steps it has 
taken . . . [to] provide alternative land or housing,” (3) when that alternative land or housing will be 
provided, (4) “the effects of an eviction” if undertaken without alternative accommodation, and (5) 
whether and how the city can take steps to “alleviate” the harms to the property owner if there was a 
delay in the eviction). 
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Occupation of Land Act, even if there was some question as to whether that 
framework should have applied.275 
One way to look at the recent decisions is that the Court is slowly moving 
along a spectrum of weak-form and strong-form enforcement, closer to the 
strong-form pole.276 In other words, that it is trying to give its initial efforts at 
weak-form review in cases like Grootboom more teeth and a higher probability 
of actually producing results within individual cases. In a careful way, the 
Court is seeking to trade off some degree of deference to the political branches 
for increasing effectiveness. 
A dynamic theory of judicial review suggests a related but different point: 
the debate about weak-form review misses key dimensions of judicial role in 
new democracies. From a dynamic perspective, the South African Constitu-
tional Court’s series of efforts to intervene in the housing sector should be 
judged at least partially by whether they helped to “catalyze” civil society 
movements and to increase the leverage of those movements over state offi-
cials, as well as by whether they extended the importance of constitutional cul-
ture within the country.277 The line of cases could be viewed as a type of “out-
sider” strategy, noted above, where courts seek to work around political institu-
tions and to instead build up alternative spaces for democratization.278 This 
should be an attractive strategy in South Africa, because the main alternative—
a strategy that seeks to temper the excesses of a dominant-party system direct-
ly—is largely closed off.279 The Court has had more space in socioeconomic 
rights cases partly because it faces sympathetic factions within the dominant-
party itself.280 
A dynamic perspective thus suggests a different set of tools for critiquing 
the work of the South African Constitutional Court. On the positive side, its 
engagement orders are directly aimed at giving civil society groups a voice. 
                                                                                                                           
 275 See, e.g., Maphango v. Aengus Lifestyle Properties, 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC) at para. 48 (S. 
Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2012/2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
7UQ6-RD68 (deciding to use the statute even though neither party had relied heavily upon it in their 
submissions, because of “[r]ule of law considerations”); see also Frank I. Michelman, Expropriation, 
Eviction, and the Gravity of the Common Law, 24 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 245, 259 (2013) (S. Afr.) 
(explaining cases like Maphango as a device of “inter-branch comity”). 
 276 See Ray, supra note 271, at 7–9 (arguing that the Court can use various devices to ratchet up 
the impact of its jurisprudence on housing issues). 
 277 See KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 172–73 (2012) 
(arguing that courts enforcing socioeconomic rights should aim to “catalyze” change by other institu-
tional actors). 
 278 See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra notes 110–150 and accompanying text (noting the struggles of the South African 
Constitutional Court in seeking to ameliorate the effects of the country’s dominant-party system). 
 280 See supra notes 144–146 (describing an instance when the Court took advantage of such a 
split within the dominant ANC party); see also ROUX, supra note 143, at 292–303 (describing the role 
of the South African Constitutional Court in an important healthcare case involving the ANC and the 
Treatment Action Campaign). 
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They force local officials to speak with groups that would otherwise be mar-
ginalized and that would otherwise have little ability to combat their evictions. 
The Court’s use of enhanced procedural techniques is particularly interesting 
in this regard: by laying out the kinds of topics that need to be addressed be-
fore any eviction may occur, and by regulating the sorts of processes through 
which the discussion must proceed, the Court has done some work in making 
sure that political actors do not simply ignore the existence of civil society.281 
But key features of the remedial design would also seem to limit the ex-
tent to which these decisions serve to increase the organization and power of 
civil society groups, or to extend the reach of constitutional culture. The Con-
stitutional Court has tended to treat the engagement actions as a set of inde-
pendent, atomized discussions between an individual set of local officials and 
an individual set of evictees. There is no institutional structure linking together 
the separate cases. And the Court’s focus has been on resolving individual cas-
es rather than on articulating a broader set of norms or values.282 The Court’s 
engagement orders generally focus on the individual cases, rather than on mak-
ing broader policy changes to the housing sphere.283 They seem calculated to 
have little symbolic value, because they generally avoid constitutional issues if 
possible and focus instead on the details of statutes.284 This may rob the 
Court’s decisions of the symbolic force needed to help create or hold together a 
movement.285 And it may prevent the Court’s decisions from having the kind of 
broader impact needed to construct and maintain a constitutional culture built 
around socioeconomic rights. 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See supra note 274 and accompanying text (describing the detailed engagement order at issue 
in the Golden Thread case). 
 282 See Ray, supra note 271, at 13 (finding that the Court often “provid[es] concrete relief to the 
individual plaintiffs without tying that relief to any broader constitutional requirement”). 
 283 See, e.g., Golden Thread, (2) SA 337 at para. 21 (issuing a detailed set of requirements for 
reporting within the confines of the individual plaintiffs at issue, but requiring no information beyond 
the confines of the specific case). 
 284 See supra note 275 and accompanying text (elaborating on the Court’s propensity for avoiding 
constitutional issues in favor of statutory issues). 
 285 The Court has sometimes showed more of a propensity to build up the power of civil society. 
In probably the Court’s most effective socioeconomic intervention, for example, the Treatment Action 
Campaign case, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), the Court relied on a relatively developed set of civil society 
actors to bring it a case challenging the government’s refusal to expand a network of highly effective 
drugs preventing transmission of HIV from mother to child, despite an absence of cost considerations 
(the drugs were being provided for free). See, e.g., William Forbath et al., Cultural Transformation, 
Deep Institutional Reform, and ESR Practice: South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign, in STONES 
OF HOPE: HOW AFRICAN ACTIVISTS RECLAIM HUMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY 
51, 51–52 (Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011). Even though the court did not issue a 
structural remedy or otherwise maintain supervision over the case, it did catalyze the Treatment Ac-
tion Campaign by giving it a clear victory over the state. See YOUNG, supra note 277, at 262 (describ-
ing the Treatment Action Campaign’s more recent attempts to pressure the state). In contrast to the 
eviction cases considered here, the Treatment Action Campaign case was a clear and well-publicized 
victory. 
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At least some of these weaknesses could be remedied without the Court’s 
approach necessarily collapsing into strong-form review, where the Court di-
rectly makes the policy decision at issue. The Court could work at institution-
alizing a long-term role for civil society linked across different cases, perhaps 
by creating a Commission composed of a mix of groups of displaced persons 
themselves with both national and international NGOs.286 The Court could also 
do more to publicize the cases over which it has taken jurisdiction, perhaps by 
holding televised or media-saturated hearings at which it dealt with the issues 
raised in the eviction petitions.287 The Court could do more to develop the sub-
stantive constitutional principles enveloped in the right to housing that it ap-
plies through its case law. Finally, it could broaden the scope of engagement by 
giving civil society groups a voice not only in the individual eviction at issue, 
but also in the broader construction of housing policy. None of these shifts 
would force the judiciary to give itself the “last word” in setting housing poli-
cy. But they probably would help to ensure a more robust civil society in the 
housing sphere. 
The weak-form review debate has been constructed to answer a particular 
problem stemming from mature democracies: how can rights enforcement best 
be structured so as to avoid invading the space of democratic actors? This is a 
highly relevant question within mature democracies; it may be a less relevant 
question in newer democracies with serious defects in their democratic institu-
tions. A dynamic perspective suggests instead a richer debate on remedies, 
which would mine a set of tools existing somewhere on a spectrum between 
weak-form and strong-form review. And it would work towards figuring out 
which of those tools did the most effective job, in different kinds of contexts, 
at building up the strength of civil society around constitutional issues, in giv-
ing civil society a voice within the state, and in constructing a more salient 
constitutional culture. 
B. The Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine 
The doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments stands as one 
of the oddest and most difficult doctrines to justify in comparative constitu-
tional law. From the standpoint of most veins of conventional constitutional 
theory, the doctrine is a puzzle. Striking down a proposed constitutional 
amendment on the ground that that amendment conflicts with unwritten consti-
tutional principles is the “most extreme of counter-majoritarian judicial 
acts.”288 Ordinary judicial review strikes down statutes but leaves political ac-
                                                                                                                           
 286 See supra notes 152–173 and accompanying text (describing how such an approach has been 
used in both Colombia and India). 
 287 See Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 153, at 1669 (describing such hearings held in Colombia). 
 288 Jacobsohn, supra note 5, at 1799. 
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tors with the safety valve of passing amendments in order to override that judi-
cial decision.289 The unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine takes 
away the safety valve and removes any possibility of political and popular 
override of the judiciary, at least short of wholesale constitutional replace-
ment.290 It is no wonder that many constitutional theorists have found the doc-
trine difficult to justify.291 
Yet in comparative terms, the doctrine is one of the greatest success sto-
ries in the field, spreading across the world to include systems in Asia, Latin 
America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.292 And in some countries, judges now 
deploy the doctrine relatively routinely: citing a few examples from India and 
Colombia might be helpful in showing the doctrine’s modern scope. In Co-
lombia, the best-known uses are the cases involving President Alvaro Uribe’s 
second and third terms, where the Court allowed a constitutional amendment 
permitting one reelection but blocked a constitutional amendment permitting 
two, in a decision heralded as potentially preventing significant democratic 
erosion.293 The Court’s reasoning noted that the proposed third term, under the 
domestic constitutional design, would give Uribe unprecedented power to ap-
point and influence officials staffing independent institutions that were sup-
posed to check him.294 Further, it pointed out after a brief comparative survey 
                                                                                                                           
 289 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative Perspective, in 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 98 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (noting 
that one function of constitutional amendment is in “trumping existing judicial interpretations”). 
 290 The question of whether constitutional replacement is a possibility depends on one’s view of 
whether and how the existing constitution constrains the possibility of writing a new constitution. See, 
e.g., Joel Colón-Ríos, The Legitimacy of the Juridical: Constituent Power, Democracy, and the Limits 
of Constitutional Reform, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 199, 203–19 (2010) (outlining and describing a 
broad theory of constituent power that gives the people powers of constitutional replacement). 
 291 See, e.g., Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5, 
22–23 (2009) (the doctrine is “curious”); Cassels, supra note 167, at 501 n.34 (“highly problematic 
and controversial”); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 
58 n.268 (2003) (“extreme example of judicial activism”). Jacobsohn himself notes that the doctrine 
may justify use only in cases so extreme as to make one wonder whether applying the doctrine would 
have any point. See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution?: A Comparative Per-
spective, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 460, 487 (2006) (“[I]f ever confronted with the felt need to exercise this 
option, sober heads might well wonder whether it was any longer worth doing.”). 
 292 See Roznai, supra note 104, 677–713 (2013) (tracing the migration of the doctrine across a 
large number of countries). 
 293 See Issacharoff, Consolidated Power, supra note 202 (crediting the Constitutional Court with 
helping to defend the democratic order). 
 294 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10, 
§ III.2.8.1, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-141-10.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/ZU87-E4PC. The Court noted that, for example, many institutions had staggered 
terms or longer terms than the President, and others were insulated by having some other institution 
make the selection. But after twelve years in power, the President would, realistically, gain power 
over virtually all of these institutions. See id. 
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that in pure presidential systems, third-term presidencies were rarely al-
lowed.295 
In a series of additional cases, the Colombian Constitutional Court has ei-
ther threatened to use or actually used the doctrine in less dramatic circum-
stances. For example, in 1994, in the landmark case C-221/94, the Colombia 
Constitutional Court legalized simple drug possession, citing principles of per-
sonal autonomy.296 When political actors passed a constitutional amendment 
recriminalizing drug possession but providing for treatment rather than crimi-
nal penalties, the amendment was challenged in front of the Court. The Court 
dismissed the petition on technical grounds, but suggested that any attempt to 
impose criminal penalties would have been an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment, because it would have replaced core constitutional principles of 
individual autonomy.297 In a second case, in 2009, in C-588/09, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court actually struck down an attempt to evade prior Constitu-
tional Court decisions forcing the entire bureaucracy—including incumbents—
to stand for meritocratic civil service exams rather than automatically being 
confirmed in their posts.298 After the Court invalidated laws attempting to ex-
empt some incumbent bureaucrats from civil service exams mandated by the 
Constitution of 1991, Congress responded by passing a constitutional amend-
ment to the same effect. The Court invalidated the constitutional amendment, 
holding that it was unconstitutional because it substituted the constitutional 
principle of meritocracy.299 
In 2012, in C-288/12, the Colombian Constitutional Court upheld a con-
stitutional amendment that created a new mechanism for executive officials to 
ask courts to review and reconsider their previously-made decisions if those 
decisions have significant fiscal consequences.300 The amendment purported to 
                                                                                                                           
 295 See id. § V.6.3.5.1.1–.1.3. 
 296 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 5, 1994, Sentencia C-221/94, 
§ 6.2.4, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/1994/c-221-94.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/LS24-2VLF. 
 297 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 22, 2011, Sentencia C-574/11, 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2011/c-574-11.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/7BYL-TGY6. The technical reasons for dismissing the petition were that the actor had only 
challenged the piece of the amendment criminalizing drug possession, and had not also included in the 
demand the part of the amendment providing for “treatment” rather than punishment. See id. § VI.6.1–
.15. 
 298 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], agosto 27, 2009, Sentencia C-588/09, 
§§ II, IV.6, VII, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/C-588-09.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A4A6-YN8D. 
 299 See id. §§ IV.6, VII. 
 300 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 18, 2012, Sentencia C-288/12, 
§§ II, VII, available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2012/C-288-12.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/Z9CT-BZ2Z (giving the text of the amendment at issue and upholding the validity 
of the law). 
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create a new constitutional principle of “fiscal sustainability.”301 The amend-
ment was passed in reaction to the Constitutional Court’s extensive jurispru-
dence on socioeconomic rights, which many government officials thought too 
costly and too interventionist.302 Under the Court’s long-standing interpretation 
of article 1 of the Constitution, which defines Colombia as a “social state of 
right,” socioeconomic rights are broadly judicially enforceable and the state 
must prioritize social spending.303 
The amendment was challenged as a possible substitution of the constitu-
tion, and the Court upheld the amendment only after limiting its effect in im-
portant ways. The Court held that “fiscal sustainability” should be understood 
as a mere instrument in service of the realization of fundamental rights and 
principles, rather than as a fundamental principle in its own right.304 Further, 
the Court held that the new mechanism for reconsideration was constitutional-
ly acceptable only because it left the judge who made the decision with full 
authority over whether to reverse the prior decision or even to hear arguments 
on a challenge.305 In effect, the Court applied a supra-constitutional canon of 
avoidance, upholding the constitutional amendment only by defanging it. 
The Indian jurisprudence shows a similar tendency towards cases where 
the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine is not necessarily play-
ing a role of democratic defense. The origins of the doctrine in fact focus on 
the protection of private property, rather than on democratic protection.306 And 
during Indira Gandhi’s emergency, which posed a significant threat of demo-
cratic erosion, the Court undertook only very cautious and limited efforts at 
stopping Gandhi from insulating her actions entirely from judicial review.307 
                                                                                                                           
 301 See id. 
 302 See id. § VI.32. 
 303 This is a simplification of a complex concept. See, e.g., David Landau, The Promise of a Min-
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 305 See id. § VI.74.3. 
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2299 (India), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/936707/, archived at http://perma.cc/
CWS7-TACP (striking down an amendment passed by Gandhi and insulating electoral disputes from 
the ordinary judiciary and the Supreme Court); Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 
1789 (India), available at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1939993/, archived at http://perma.cc/7LKY-
1558 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1501 
These decisions played a modest but perhaps meaningful role at preventing an 
erosion of democracy. More recent cases, issued after the political system 
fragmented, have also focused on the insulation of activity from judicial re-
view, but within quite different contexts. For example, in 1997, in L. Chandra 
Kumar v. Union of India, the Indian Supreme Court held that constitutional 
amendments shunting cases concerned with the civil service away from the 
ordinary judiciary and into newly created administrative tribunals were viola-
tions of the basic structure doctrine and thus unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments.308 Indeed, one commentator has argued that the main thrust of 
the doctrine, in terms of its actual use, has been to allow the judiciary to act as 
a “closed shop” by cutting off other avenues of redress like special tribunals 
and arbitration panels.309 
In examining these cases, the core question is the following: What ex-
plains the divergence between the expectations of standard constitutional theo-
ry and the reality of practice, under which the doctrine is regularly used? A 
dynamic perspective of judicial role offers the groundwork for a reasonable 
defense of the doctrine.310 Descriptively, it explains why the use has become so 
routinized across certain countries. Usage of the doctrine is based both in a 
distrust of existing democratic institutions, which are seen as capable of pro-
ducing flawed constitutional amendments, and concern about the effects that 
certain amendments might have on the democratic order.311 Normatively, the 
fact that certain democracies are relatively fragile gives some justification for 
using the doctrine in order to defend against democratic erosion. At least some 
uses of the doctrine—the Uribe reelection decisions and the Indian cases dur-
                                                                                                                           
4EX2 (in a post-emergency case reviewing emergency-era amendments, striking down constitutional 
changes that insulated legislation intended to realize certain kinds of goals from judicial review). 
 308 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125, at para. 100, available at http://
indiankanoon.org/doc/1152518/, archived at http://perma.cc/M7LU-CS4Y. 
 309 See Rohit De, Jurist’s Prudence: The Indian Supreme Court’s Response to Institutional Chal-
lenges, I•CONNECT (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2012/12/jurists-prudence-the-
indian-supreme-courts-response-to-institutional-challenges/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6GR-8E2L. 
 310 In contrast, existing theories do a fairly poor job of explaining and justifying the doctrine. The 
leading contender is the theory of “original constituent power,” under which some changes to the 
existing legal order are so fundamental that they are reserved to the “people” and can only be made 
through wholesale replacement of the existing constitution. Colón-Ríos, supra note 290, at 204–09 
(providing an overview of the theory of constituent power). In contrast, the “constituted powers”—the 
institutions of state—enjoy only a limited power of constitutional change, without any ability to alter 
those fundamental principles. This principle has been adopted by many of the courts using the doc-
trine. See id. at 219–28. But unless the constitutional text clearly limits the power of constitutional 
amendment (which is fairly rare), there is no reason to assume any limitation on the amendment pow-
er of the constituted powers, and perhaps even less reason to think that courts rather than the political 
branches should be the ones charged with discovering those limits. See Carlos Bernal, Unconstitution-
al Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification and 
Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339, 347 (2013). 
 311 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 73, 33 (noting that the Indian basic structure doctrine gains 
strength out of a sense of democratic distrust). 
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ing the emergency—may be justifiable in light of the fragility of their demo-
cratic orders.312 Where judges have good reason to believe that a set of consti-
tutional changes raises a significant risk of democratic erosion, they may be on 
solid ground in striking down constitutional amendments.313 
Use beyond clear cases of democratic preservation raises more difficult 
issues. There are dual risks to broader use: (1) excessive distrust of current 
democracy and (2) possible warping of the pathway of democracy.314 On the 
first point, it is surely not an accident that the doctrine has made the most 
headway within systems where there is a pervasive public distrust of political 
institutions, and where judges openly share that distrust.315 But the fact that 
political institutions sometimes function badly does not imply that they always 
function badly. This suggests that use of the doctrine should be restrained. In-
validation of a constitutional amendment is an act that expresses much more 
disrespect of political institutions than ordinary exercises of judicial review. 
Many—perhaps most—uses of the doctrine fail under this criterion. Many 
uses of the doctrine appear to be based on turf-protection: courts use their ul-
timate power over constitutional amendment to protect the doctrines or inter-
ests that are dear to them. There is also some evidence that the doctrine can 
become an ordinary tool of democracy-improvement: courts strike down 
amendments eluding meritocracy, or transferring cases outside of the ordinary 
judiciary, not because they reasonably fear a significant retrogression in the 
democratic order but because they perpetuate problematic aspects of the sys-
tem, like bureaucratic incapacity.316 These uses of the doctrine are difficult to 
justify: the ends pursued by courts may be important, but there are less prob-
lematic ways to pursue them. Exercises of ordinary judicial review should suf-
fice. 
The second risk—that use might warp democratic development—may be 
less serious. The doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments is 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See supra notes 131–133, 194–196 and accompanying text. 
 313 There is a separate question lurking here—how do judges know that a given constitutional 
change in fact will work substantial erosion in the democratic order? One possibility is to use compar-
ative or transnational guidance as a check on judicial over-activism, and to strike down amendments 
primarily when the change at issue would create an institutional design not generally seen elsewhere. 
See Dixon & Landau, supra note 106. In the Uribe cases, for example, the Court placed great weight 
on the fact that two-term presidencies were common in pure presidential systems, but the allowance of 
additional terms beyond two terms is quite rare comparatively. See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Con-
stitutional Court], febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10, §§ V.6.3.5.1.1–.1.3, available at http://
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-141-10.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/AC8A-
JK3E. 
 314 See supra notes 216–219, 250–254 and accompanying text (discussing both of these problems 
as they bear on a dynamic theory of role). 
 315 See supra notes 162–166, 216–217, 311 and accompanying text (giving examples of judges 
expressing distrust of democracy in both India and Colombia). 
 316 See supra notes 299–308 and accompanying text (discussing cases from India and Colombia). 
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probably less corrosive than excluding some political forces from electoral 
politics, as counseled by the militant democracy model. Exclusion of major 
political actors plausibly weakens the development of electoral politics and 
may disenchant some groups of citizens with democracy.317 Overuse of the 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments doctrine could cause a variant of 
the “judicial overhang” problem, dampening the extent to which political ac-
tors internalize constitutional values.318 But this would seem to be a less seri-
ous risk to democratic development. 
Further, it could be that use of the doctrine has an opposing effect, help-
ing to spread constitutional culture in countries where it is weak or non-
existent. Few decisions send a clearer signal of the importance of constitution-
al values than decisions striking down constitutional amendments because of 
their inconsistency with those values. These decisions may alert citizens that 
political actors are posing a substantial danger to principles that the court 
views as fundamental constitutional values. In practice, a judicial decision 
striking down a constitutional amendment will rarely act as the final word, but 
instead may start a dialogue about the importance of the principle in ques-
tion.319 In other words, invalidation of constitutional amendments may play a 
“fire alarm” function, telling the populace that something worth paying atten-
tion to is going on.320 
If this is right, then it means that the truly hard cases are ones like the Co-
lombian “fiscal sustainability” decision.321 The Court has long pushed an inter-
pretation of the constitution as prioritizing social welfare, arguing that Colom-
bia in its first article is defined as a “social state of right” and issuing influen-
tial decisions protecting socioeconomic rights.322 Indeed, the Court is probably 
best known for its aggressive enforcement of rights like the right to healthcare 
and housing.323 In a mature democratic order, the choice of democratic actors 
                                                                                                                           
 317 See, e.g., RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITI-
CAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 487–88 
(1991) (referring to the problem of the Argentine Peronist Party being prohibited from winning elec-
tions because of its repugnance to elites as an “impossible game” that destabilized the regime). 
 318 See TUSHNET, supra note 59, at 57–58. 
 319 Cf. Thomaz Pereira, Entrenchment and Constitutional Politics: Interpreting Eternity Clauses 
(Apr. 19, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that “eternity clauses” prohibiting constitutional 
change to certain articles acted as the start of dialogue rather than as the final word). 
 320 See Law, supra note 189, at 731–32 (defending judicial review as a “fire alarm,” or a way for 
citizens to get cheap information about abuses by their government, and as a coordination mecha-
nism). 
 321 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 18, 2012, Sentencia C-288/12, 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2012/C-288-12.htm, archived at http://
perma.cc/8QYL-GUEC. 
 322 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 323 See, e.g., Manuel José Cepeda-Espinoza, Transcript: Social and Economic Rights and the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1699 (2011) (noting the importance of socio-
economic rights decisions to the Colombian Constitutional Court). 
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to amend the constitution in order to subordinate social rights to fiscal consid-
erations, or at least to make them weigh equally, would seem defensible as an 
alternative interpretation of fundamental principles. But in Colombia, there 
may be some value to the Court’s articulation of the “social state of right” 
principle as a fundamental principle of Colombian constitutionalism. Such a 
decision might be part of the effort to create a constitutional culture in the 
country. And the Court’s decision has not acted as the final word. The Con-
gress has responded with a law supposedly developing the constitutional 
amendment but in reality giving the amendment an interpretation that gives 
“fiscal sustainability” much greater weight than in had in the Court’s deci-
sion.324 The resulting exchange may have started something of a political de-
bate about the relative importance and meaning of the “social state of right” 
criterion in Colombian constitutionalism. 
In short, the dynamic theory suggests that many uses of the doctrine are 
unjustifiable. Nevertheless, it provides some support for at least a limited ver-
sion of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments as a way to 
preserve democracy against substantial erosion. More tentatively, it may also 
provide support for a somewhat broader version of the doctrine as a way to 
identify and publicize fundamental constitutional values.325 
CONCLUSION 
Recent scholarship has argued that standard constitutional theory asks a 
question—how to square judicial review with democracy—that it cannot an-
swer in a coherent or satisfying way.326 Constitutional theorists should there-
fore arguably seek a different, and more productive, set of questions.327 This 
article is an attempt to construct a more practical and productive constitutional 
theory, at least for a subset of constitutional courts. 
The emerging constitutional courts and constitutional orders of what 
scholars have called the “Global South” merit analysis on their own terms. 
                                                                                                                           
 324 See, e.g., Carlos Parra Dussán, Incidente de impacto fiscal, LA REPÚBLICA (Jan. 31, 2014), 
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These courts face a set of institutional and social problems that often dwarf 
those found in more mature democracies. This paper argues that a defensible 
conception of judicial role in these systems is a dynamic one, which focuses on 
courts seeking to improve the quality of democracy over time. The main ad-
vantage of such a conception is in suggesting a more fruitful set of questions, 
most of which need empirical study. 
We need more work on the kinds of judicial strategies that are possible in 
different kinds of political contexts, and also on the effects of those strategies 
on their political systems. We need to know whether “insider” strategies, which 
focus on building up political institutions directly, or “outsider” strategies, 
which focus on building up democratic spaces around political institutions, are 
more likely to be effective. And most broadly, we need research on the dynam-
ic effects of judicial activism, within initially problematic political orders, on 
politics and society. To what extent can courts improve the functioning of 
democratic institutions, build up civil society, or spread constitutional culture? 
It is remarkable how little we know about the answers to those important ques-
tions. The ultimate value of a dynamic theory, then, may be in suggesting an 
agenda for scholars and judges. 
